

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Criminal Division

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
vs.
RAYMOND JOSEPH SHADE, JR.
Defendant
No. 4800-2022

OPINION AND ORDER

By: Conrad, J.
Dated: May 5, 2025

Pending before the court is Defendant’s Post-Sentence Motion which (1) seeks to vacate Defendant’s conviction for a person not to possess a firearm, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1),¹ for the reason that the underlying felony drug conviction was not a crime of violence and hence the conviction violates Defendant’s second amendment rights and which (2) seeks to correct an illegal sentence pertaining to the convictions for terroristic threats and simple assault. For the reasons that follow the court will deny the motion to vacate the conviction for a person not to possess a firearm and grant the motion to correct the sentence for the convictions for terroristic threats and simple assault.

History of the Case.

By Information filed December 6, 2022, Defendant was charged with Burglary – Overnight Accommodations; Person Present, Bodily Injury Crime,² Possession of Firearm Prohibited,³ Makes Repairs/Sell/etc. Offensive Weapon,⁴ Terroristic Threats,⁵ and Simple Assault.⁶ On July 15, 2024, Defendant proceeded to a jury trial self-represented although he had standby counsel. Prior to the start of trial, the court bifurcated the charge for possession of firearm because evidence of Defendant’s prior conviction for a felony could prejudice the jury. At the conclusion of each trial, Defendant was found guilty on all charges.

The evidence in the first trial for Defendant showed that on the evening of October 29, 2022, Defendant went to the home of the victim in East Hempfield Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. The Defendant and the victim knew each other because the victim had used the Defendant to perform general maintenance on some of his properties up until 2019. In February of 2022, the Defendant arrived at the

¹ The Information shows this charge being graded as a felony of the second degree; however, the Commonwealth made an oral motion to amend the grading to a felony of the first degree which the court permitted.

² 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)(i).
³ 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
⁴ 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 908(a).
⁵ 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1).
⁶ 18 Pa. C.S.A. §2701(a)(3).

victim's office wearing a gas mask and saying, "we need to talk." When the victim asked who he was, the Defendant pulled the mask up and the victim recognized Defendant who then hit the victim on the side of his face knocking him to the ground.

On the evening of October 29, 2022, the victim was in his kitchen when he noticed someone was inside of his enclosed back porch and he recognized the Defendant through the glass portion of the door. The victim went to the kitchen door and locked it. The Defendant told the victim that he wanted to talk. The victim said he could not talk and the Defendant then pointed a shotgun at the victim. The victim then stated he needed to use the bathroom and walked away from the door. He then called police who arrived at the victim's home.

After the police arrived, the Defendant was located in the backyard of the victim's home with a sawed-off shot gun which had a knife screwed to the front of it like a bayonet and which had a pistol grip made of welded chain similar to the sawed-off shot gun used in the Terminator movies. Police also discovered multiple knives and a blindfold on Defendant.

During Defendant's cross-examination of the victim, it became apparent that the Defendant was obsessed with the victim and believed that the victim had something to do with his wife and child's disappearance. In reality, Defendant's wife and child had left him. Defendant explained that the reason he held this belief was because the victim had sent him a "calling card." Defendant said that while Defendant was repairing a furnace at the victim's home some years before, the boiler part name had been changed to "munchkin" and "munchkin" was the name that the victim called children. (N.T. pp. 351-357).

During the Defendant's trial for Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person, the Commonwealth introduced a certified copy of the docket entries and sentencing sheet for Defendant's felony convictions pursuant to the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act docketed in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas at docket number 2273 of 2003. The sentencing sheet showed convictions for three counts of delivery of a controlled substance, all of which are felonies. (N.T. pp. 502-504; Commonwealth Exhibits 21 and 22). No other facts regarding these offenses were placed on the record.

Sentencing was scheduled for October 31, 2024; however, on September 30, 2024, the Office of the Public Defender filed a Motion to Determine Competency Prior to Sentencing which was granted by the court and sentencing was deferred. On January 23, 2025, the Commonwealth filed a motion to reschedule sentencing and contended that Defendant had been found competent. Sentencing was rescheduled for March 3, 2025.

On the morning of March 3, 2025, the Public Defender's Office filed a Motion to Vacate Defendant's conviction of person not to possess a firearm and asked the court to defer sentencing so its motion could be addressed. Initially the court agreed and set a briefing scheduled, but on March 4, 2025, after the Commonwealth filed a motion asking the court to not permit any further delay in sentencing, the court issued an

order to vacate the briefing schedule order and instead instructed that the Public Defender's Motion should be construed as a post-sentence motion to be filed after sentencing.

Sentencing was finally held on March 26, 2025. The court sentenced Defendant as follows: (1) 80 months to 160 months for burglary; (2) 90 months to 180 months for possession of firearm by prohibited person to run consecutive to count 1; (3) 12 months to 24 months for make repairs to run consecutive to count 2; (4) 12 months to 24 months for terroristic threats to run concurrently to count 1; and (5) 12 months to 24 months for simple assault to run concurrently to count 1. The aggregate sentence imposed was 184 months to 368 months in a state correctional institution.

At sentencing, the transcript shows that the Public Defender's Office marked, but did not admit, a copy of the criminal information and criminal complaint for docket number 2273 of 3002. No evidence regarding the underlying facts were provided, although the Chief Public Defender represented to the sentencing court that no firearms were used nor was there a threat of violence or assaultive behavior. (Sentencing N.T. p. 17). The criminal information shows that Defendant sold the cocaine to an undercover officer. (Commonwealth Exhibit 22).

The Chief Public Defender also told the court that despite trying to talk to the Defendant, the Defendant remains fixed in his belief that powerful figures in the community are looking for Defendant's demise. The Chief Public Defender represented that Defendant's mental health issues began in 2019 and it is documented that he has schizophrenia. He reiterated that Defendant is convinced that the victim and government officials are responsible for taking his wife and son. (N.T. pp. 11 and 14). The court stated that someone like Defendant who presents as a pleasant individual but yet did these things is scary and a danger to society. (N.T. p. 27).

On April 7, 2025, the Public Defender's Office timely filed a Post-Sentence Motion.⁷ The court ordered briefs which have been filed. The matter is now ready for disposition.

Analysis

"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. Const. amend. II.

.....

The most recent Second Amendment decisions have not squarely addressed the issue whether a persons convicted of felony drug trafficking offenses are protected by the Second Amendment. Additionally, the historical, rather than analytical, framework pronounced by the Supreme Court does not provide clear and well-defined guidance how to apply its test to modern-day issues which could never have been contemplated in colonial times. A brief, but not comprehensive, summary of those cases is set forth below.

Beginning with *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the

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The tenth day was a Saturday.

high court held that a ban on possession of an operable handgun in the home was unconstitutional. At issue was a District of Columbia law that banned handguns and required other firearms in the home to be rendered and kept inoperable at all times. *Heller*, a special policeman, had applied to register a handgun he wished to keep at home, but the District refused. *Heller* filed suit and the case ultimately made its way to the United States Supreme Court.

The Court's analysis began with "the strong presumption that that the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans" *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 581. The Court stated later in its opinion, however, that "nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons." *Id.* at 626. "Assuming that *Heller* is not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights, the District must permit him to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home. *Id.* at 570 (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court in *New York State Rifle & Pistole Assoc. Inc., v. Bruen*, *Superintendent of New York State Police*, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), held that New York's proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in public for self-defense. The Court did not address whether felons may possess firearms and referred to the petitioners as "two ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens—are part of 'the people.'" *Id.* at 23.

Bruen relied on *Heller* and its extensive historical analysis except that it changed the two-step, means-end scrutiny test that the federal courts had adopted after *Heller*.⁸ 597 U.S. at 9. Thus, the test enunciated in *Breun* required a court to ask two questions:

First, a reviewing court must ask whether the plain text of the Second Amendment covers the individual's proposed conduct so that the Constitution protects that conduct. If so, the second question is whether the government has justified the firearm regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's unqualified command.

Id. at 17, 24-25

With respect to how the Second Amendment should address societal problems, the *Bruen* Court said:

When a challenged regulation addresses a general so-

⁸ Following *Heller*, nearly all federal courts of appeals followed the Third Circuit's lead in *United States v. Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010), and adopted some form of a two-step, means-end scrutiny test. See *Barris v. Stroud Twp.*, 310 A.3d 175, 182 (Pa. 2024) and *Range v. Attorney General*, 124 F. 4th 218, 225 (3rd Cir. 2024).

cietal problem that has persisted since the 18th century, the lack of a distinctly similar historical regulation addressing that problem is relevant evidence that the challenged regulation is inconsistent with the Second Amendment. Likewise, if earlier generations addressed the societal problem, but did so through materially different means, that also could be evidence that a modern regulation is unconstitutional. And if some jurisdictions actually attempted to enact analogous regulations during this timeframe, but those proposals were rejected on constitutional grounds, that rejection surely would provide some probative evidence of unconstitutionality.

Id. at 26-27.

In 2024, the Supreme Court decided *United States v. Rahimi*, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), and held that the statute under which that defendant was convicted, and which was based on a court finding that he posed a credible threat to the physical safety of another, is facially constitutional under the Second Amendment. The statute at issue, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(8), forbids possession of a firearm by a person subject to a domestic violence order if the order includes a finding that the person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of the person's intimate partner. The Court found that Rahimi had a restraining order entered against him after a hearing at which he had an opportunity to be heard and a court made a finding that he represented "a credible threat to the physical safety" to the victim and her family.⁹ Rahimi was subsequently charged with possession of a firearm and ammunition and after withdrawing his constitutional challenge to the indictment, he pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm while subject to a domestic violence restraining order, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). On appeal, Rahimi again raised the constitutional challenge, which was denied and he asked for reconsideration. While his motion was pending, the Court decided *Bruen* and ultimately *certiorari* was granted.

In its opinion, the Court noted that Rahimi's challenge to the statute was a facial challenge as applied to him. It then examined the challenged statute under the test announced in *Bruen*. The Court recognized the difficulty courts were having employing the methodology of *Bruen* and explained that "[t]hese precedents were not meant to suggest a law trapped in amber." *Rahimi* U.S. 602 at 691. The Court further explained that in order to show that a regulation fits within the historical tradition, evidence of firearms that were in existence in 1791 or evidence of regulations identical to the ones found in 1791 was not required. "By that same logic, the Second Amendment permits more than just those regulations identical to ones that could be found in 1791. Holding otherwise would be as mistaken as applying the pro-

⁹ The Court provided further details regarding Rahimi's rather ugly criminal history including the fact that he was the main suspect in at least five different shootings. *Rahimi*, at 602 U.S. 687.

tections of the right only to muskets and sabers.” *Rahimi*, 602 U.S. at 691-92.

The Court explained that under *Bruen*,

the appropriate analysis involves considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition, focusing on [w]hy and how the regulation burdens the right to keep and bear arms and when a challenged regulation does not precisely match its historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster it need not be a ‘dead ringer’ or a ‘historical twin.’

Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692 (citation omitted). Applying these principles, the Court found that the statute survived a constitutional challenge after it found that surety and going armed laws from 1795 provided a historical analogue. The Court stated that these laws taken together “confirm what common sense suggests: When an individual poses a clear threat of physical violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed.” *Id.* at 698.

The Court then went on to say, “[w]hile we do not suggest that the Second Amendment prohibits the enactment of laws banning the possession of guns by categories of persons thought by a legislature to present a special danger of misuse, we note that Section 922(g)(8) applies only once a court has found that the defendant represents a credible threat of safety to another. That matches the surety and going armed laws....” *Id.* at 698-99 (citing *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626).

Justice Thomas’ dissent criticized the majority opinion stating that the Court mixed and matched historical laws which defeats the purpose of a historical inquiry. *Id.* at 772. Justice Thomas further stated that “[n]either the Court nor the Government identifies a single historical regulation with a comparable burden and justification as § 922(g)(8). Because there is none, I would conclude that the statute is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.” *Id.*

Justice Thomas’ conclusion that there is no historical regulation consistent with the federal statute in that case is likewise apparent here as a quick Google search will reveal that regulating illicit drugs did not come to this country until the late 1800’s with laws banning opium dens in San Francisco.¹⁰ As suggested by the Commonwealth here, one could perhaps research smuggling which was rampant in the United States early on, but this type of historical research raises significant questions as neither lawyers nor judges are trained in making the historical analysis required by *Bruen*. Our own Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said that “[m]ore guidance in this challenging and ever-shifting area of the law is welcome.” *Barris v. Stroud Twp.*, 310

¹⁰ See Wikipedia: Drug Prohibition. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drug_prohibition#:~:text=The%20early%20association%20between%20coffeehouses,attempt%20to%20end%20the%20trade.

A.3d 175, 190 (2024).

I. Defendant's "as-applied" challenge to Section 6105(a)(1).

The court now turns to Defendant's argument that his conviction for person not to possess a firearm pursuant to 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6105(a) is unconstitutional because his underlying felony drug convictions were not violent in nature.

"[A]cts passed by the General Assembly are strongly presumed to be constitutional, including the manner in which they were passed." *Commonwealth v. Neiman*, 624 Pa. 53, 67, 84 A.3d 603, 611 (2013).

[A] statute is presumed to be constitutional and will only be invalidated as unconstitutional if it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates constitutional rights. [A] defendant may contest the constitutionality of a statute on its face or as-applied. A facial attack tests a law's constitutionality based on its text alone and does not consider the facts or circumstances of a particular case. An as-applied attack, in contrast, does not contend that a law is unconstitutional as written but that its application to a particular person under particular circumstances deprived that person of a constitutional right. A criminal defendant may seek to vacate his conviction by demonstrating a law's facial or as-applied unconstitutionality.

Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 328 A.3d 1076, 1085 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted). "If there is any doubt that a challenger has failed to demonstrate the high burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute, then that doubt must be resolved in favor of finding the statute constitutional." *Id.* (citation omitted) (cleaned up).

The statutory provision applicable to Defendant is found at 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1) which provides as follows:

(a) Offense defined.—

(1) A person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated in subsection (b), within or without this Commonwealth, regardless of the length of sentence or whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c) shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth.

....

The "conduct" that meets the criteria in subsection (c) provides:

(c) Other persons.--In addition to any person who has been convicted of any offense listed under subsection

(b), the following persons shall be subject to the prohibition of subsection (a):

....

(2) A person who has been convicted of an offense under the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, or any equivalent Federal statute or equivalent statute of any other state, that may be punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding two years.

Here, Defendant's disqualifying conviction is pursuant to subsection (c)(2) of the statute as he was convicted on three counts under the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act for which he could be punished by a term of imprisonment exceeding two years.¹¹

While Defendant repeatedly asserts that his underlying criminal conviction is for a "nonviolent drug felony," this is not necessarily obvious from the record. The court examined the certified docket entries for Defendant's 2003 case and saw that Defendant entered into a negotiated guilty plea. There was no transcript from Defendant's sentencing or anything else of record which could provide a complete picture, such as what the *Rahimi* Court had regarding that defendant. Even if the court found there was no actual violence involved with the underlying drug-trafficking offenses, the controlling cases still do not compel the conclusion that Section 6105(c) is unconstitutional as applied to this Defendant.

Defendant relies on the Superior Court's memorandum opinion in *Commonwealth v. Anderson*, 2024 WL 5205507,¹² which was decided after *Rahimi*. The Superior Court vacated that defendant's convictions for persons not to possess due to the disqualifying conviction being a nonviolent conviction for delivery of cocaine. Defendant contends his case is identical to *Anderson*.

The facts in that case show that the defendant was convicted of two counts of person not to possess a firearm, carrying a firearm without a license, DUI – Highest Rate, and other related offenses. During the second part of his bifurcated trial -- person not to possess a firearm counts -- the jury was shown evidence that the defendant's disqualifying conviction for persons not to possess was a felony "delivery of cocaine."

The Superior Court addressed the issue whether Anderson's conviction under 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1) was in violation of his Second

¹¹ Specifically, Defendant was convicted pursuant to the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act at 35 Pa. C.S.A. § 780-113 (a)(30) which states:

Except as authorized by this act, the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance by a person not registered under this act, or a practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State board, or knowingly creating, delivering or possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance.

¹² Rule 126 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure governs the citation of memorandum opinions. Specifically, it allows parties to cite non-precedential decisions, which are unpublished memorandum decisions of the Superior Court issued after May 1, 2019, or unreported memorandum opinions of the Commonwealth Court issued after January 15, 2008, for their persuasive value. These decisions are not binding precedent but can be cited to support an argument.

Amendment right to bear arms when his nonviolent felony conviction lacks historical tradition to permanently disarm him as an burden after it concluded that the underlying offense was nonviolent.¹³ The Court stated as follows:

Given Anderson’s contention that there exists no historical analogue from which the Commonwealth can show a history or tradition of disarming those convicted of nonviolent drug offenses traceable to the time of the adoption of the Second or Fourteenth Amendments, and the Commonwealth’s failure to proffer any constitutional text and history analysis prescribed therein, we are constrained to conclude that in this case, the Commonwealth has failed to meet its burden.

Anderson at *6.

Therefore, this court is not convinced by *Anderson* due to its holding being based upon the Commonwealth’s failure in this one instance to provide the requisite historical analogue.

The court further rejects the false dichotomy that Defendant presents in his brief. Defendant argues that *Anderson* is consistent with *Range v. Attorney General*, 124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024), which held that a petitioner should not be deprived of his right to bear arms because his underlying offense was nonviolent, and that *Commonwealth v. McIntyre*, ___ A.3d ___, 2025 WL 750585 (Pa. Super. 2025), does not compel a different result as it held that Section 6105(a) is constitutional where it precludes those convicted of violent felonies from possessing firearms. A close reading of the two cases demonstrates the fallacy with Defendant’s argument.

Range is cited by Defendant to argue that Section 6105 would be unconstitutional as applied to felons who commit nonviolent offences. *Range*, also decided on remand after *Rahimi*, held that “the Government has not shown that the principles underlying the Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation support depriving Range of his Second Amendment right to possess a firearm.” *Range*, 124 F. 4th at 232. Importantly, the Court went on to state that “[o]ur decision today is a *narrow one*. Bryan Range challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) only as applied to him given his violation of 62 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 481(a).” *Id.* (emphasis added).

The facts of *Range* are also very different from those here as Range was not a defendant seeking to vacate his criminal conviction for a person not to possess but rather was a petitioner seeking to have his gun rights restored. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals portrayed Range sympathetically as the father of three young children who merely signed a food stamp application prepared by his wife which understated his already meager income. Although Range did not recall reviewing the application, he nonetheless took responsibility for it and pleaded guilty

¹³ The opinion does not set forth the underlying facts of Anderson’s disqualifying conviction or reference where the underlying facts appear in the record. Instead, the opinion just concludes that the offense was nonviolent.

to one count of making a false statement pursuant to 62 Pa. C.S.A. § 481, which, in 1995, was a misdemeanor punishable by up to five years' imprisonment. Range received a sentence of probation and had to pay restitution and costs all of which he completed. The conviction, unbeknownst to Range however, precluded Range from possessing a firearm under federal felon-in-possession law which makes it "unlawful for any person ... who has been convicted in any court, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" to "possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The Third Circuit rejected the Government's argument that the Second Amendment did not apply to Range because the right to bear arms historically extended to the political community of "law-abiding, responsible citizens" of which Range was not one. The Court said that "the criminal histories of the plaintiffs in *Heller*, *McDonald*, and *Bruen* were not at issue in those cases so their references to 'law-abiding, responsible citizens' were dicta." *Id.* at 226.

Interestingly, *McIntyre*, the second case Defendant cites for the proposition that the disqualifying offense must be a violent one to be constitutional, did not view *Heller* and *Bruen* as dicta because McIntyre's criminal history was at issue. *McIntyre* had been remanded by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court following *Rahimi* and on remand, the Court held that Section 6105's prohibition of persons convicted of one of the enumerated offenses in Section 6105(b) from possessing a firearm is not unconstitutional pursuant to *Bruen*.¹⁴ Indeed, the Court

¹⁴ McIntyre had appealed his judgment of sentence for person prohibited from possessing a firearm pursuant to Section 6105(a)(1) as he had previously been convicted of, burglary, robbery and aggravated assault, which are listed within the enumerated offenses set forth in Section 6105(b) which states as follows:

(b) Enumerated offenses.--The following offenses shall apply to subsection (a):

Section 908 (relating to prohibited offensive weapons).
 Section 911 (relating to corrupt organizations).
 Section 912 (relating to possession of weapon on school property).
 Section 2502 (relating to murder).
 Section 2503 (relating to voluntary manslaughter).
 Section 2504 (relating to involuntary manslaughter) if the offense is based on the reckless use of a firearm.
 Section 2702 (relating to aggravated assault).
 Section 2703 (relating to assault by prisoner).
 Section 2704 (relating to assault by life prisoner).
 Section 2709.1 (relating to stalking).
 Section 2716 (relating to weapons of mass destruction).
 Section 2901 (relating to kidnapping).
 Section 2902 (relating to unlawful restraint).
 Section 2910 (relating to luring a child into a motor vehicle or structure).
 Section 3121 (relating to rape).
 Section 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse).
 Section 3125 (relating to aggravated indecent assault).
 Section 3301 (relating to arson and related offenses).
 Section 3302 (relating to causing or risking catastrophe).
 Section 3502 (relating to burglary).
 Section 3503 (relating to criminal trespass) if the offense is graded a felony of the second degree or higher.
 Section 3701 (relating to robbery).
 Section 3702 (relating to robbery of motor vehicle).
 Section 3921 (relating to theft by unlawful taking or disposition) upon conviction of the second felony offense.
 Section 3923 (relating to theft by extortion) when the offense is accompanied by threats of violence.
 Section 3925 (relating to receiving stolen property) upon conviction of the second felony offense.
 Section 4906 (relating to false reports to law enforcement authorities) if the fictitious report involved the theft of a firearm as provided in section 4906(c)(2).
 Section 4912 (relating to impersonating a public servant) if the person is impersonating a law enforcement officer.
 Section 4952 (relating to intimidation of witnesses or victims).
 Section 4953 (relating to retaliation against witness, victim or party).
 Section 5121 (relating to escape).
 Section 5122 (relating to weapons or implements for escape).
 Section 5501(3) (relating to riot).
 Section 5515 (relating to prohibiting of paramilitary training).
 Section 5516 (relating to facsimile weapons of mass destruction).
 Section 6110.1 (relating to possession of firearm by minor).

found it only necessary to address the first part of the inquiry announced by *Bruen* and found that the defendant was not one of “the people” to whom the Second Amendment extends.

The *McIntyre* Court noted that *Bruen* did not directly address the question whether prohibiting felons from possessing guns violates the Second Amendment and based upon at *Bruen*’s repetitive highlighting of the rights of “law-abiding” citizens concluded that *Breun* “ends at the feet of those individuals who are not law-abiding citizens.” *Id.* (citing *United States v. Coleman*, 2023 WL 122401 at *2 (N.D. W.Va.. 2023). Further, the Superior Court said that:

Bruen reinforced *Heller*, which unequivocally stated that its holding that individuals had a right to bear arms under the Second Amendment did not in any way call into doubt the government’s ability to prohibit felons from possessing firearms. Therefore, we find that the plain text of the Second Amendment does not cover McIntyre and his possession of a firearm as a convicted offender.

Id. at *9. Based on this conclusion, there was no need to address *Bruen*’s second question.

The Court then turned to *Rahimi* and addressed whether it had any impact on its decision. The Court reiterated that it remained bound by *Bruen* although it found the *Rahimi* Court’s clarification of the *Bruen* methodology valuable going forward.

The Court quoted from Judge Stabile’s analysis in *Commonwealth v. Farmer*,¹⁵ 329 A.3d 449, 454, 458 (Pa. Super 2024), which in part stated that the lesson learned from *Rahimi* was that the surety and going armed laws provided “an avenue for upholding felon firearms bans such as that of Section 6105, at least temporarily.”¹⁶ *McIntyre*, at 10. Thus, the Court said that while it did not reach *Bruen*’s history-and-tradition inquiry under the circumstances of the case, the Court did not find the reasoning from *Rahimi* to be inconsistent with its conclusion. *Id.*

Defendant’s argument, as premised on the cases cited by him, is that in order for Section 6105(a)(1) to be constitutional as applied, the disqualifying conviction must involve violence.¹⁷ While it is true that

Section 6301 (relating to corruption of minors).

Section 6302 (relating to sale or lease of weapons and explosives).

Any offense equivalent to any of the above-enumerated offenses under the prior laws of this Commonwealth or any offense equivalent to any of the above-enumerated offenses under the statutes of any other state or of the United States.

¹⁵ In *Farmer* the Court concluded there that Section 6105 deprives some of “the people” of the right to bear arms and therefore Section 6105 implicated conduct protected under the Second Amendment. Applying the next step of *Breun*, the Court asked whether the legislature may constitutionally strip that right because of the prior robbery conviction.

¹⁶ Both of the defendants in *McIntyre* and *Farmer* had committed offenses enumerated in Section 6105(b). In *Commonwealth v. Jenkins*, 328 A.3d 1076 (Pa. Super. 2024), the Court held that Section 6105(a)(1) as applied to fugitives from justice, enumerated in Section 6105(c)(1), did not violate the Second Amendment as applied. The Court in *Jenkins* concluded that disarming fugitives under Section 6105 was consistent with principles that underpin our tradition of firearm regulations because of its relation to surety laws and historical laws disarming vagrants and transients. See also *Commonwealth v. Yockey*, 2025 WL 1078787 (Pa. Super. 2025) filed April 10, 2025, holding Section 6105(a)(1) constitutional where the disqualifying offense was enumerated in Section 6105(b).

¹⁷ Under that rationale, one could be convicted under several of the enumerated offenses in subsection (b) and if

Rahimi and *Range* utilized that rationale to reach a decision, that does not mean that a conviction enumerated under Section 6105(a)(1) can only be constitutional if violence is involved, especially when considering the holdings from these cases are to be narrowly construed.

This court finds *McIntyre* to be the better analysis. That opinion relies on the Supreme Court's decision in *Heller* and notes that *Heller* remains unchanged after *Bruen* and *Rahimi*, neither of which addressed the issue whether the Second Amendment no longer extends to a person once convicted of felony drug trafficking.

This is not a case about the right to bear arms. Defendant is a convicted felon for drug trafficking and pursuant to Section 6105(a)(1) he knew that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm. He does not come to the court asking to have his Second Amendment rights restored. Instead, he is a person seeking to avoid criminal liability.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant has not demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court that Section 6105(a)(1) as applied to him "clearly, palpably, and plainly" violates his constitutional rights. Therefore, the motion to vacate Count 2, Person not to Possess, is denied.

II. The sentences for terroristic threats and simple assault are illegal.

Regarding Defendant's second issue, that Defendant's sentences for terroristic threats and simple assault are illegal, the court has carefully reviewed the record to ascertain the crime that the Defendant intended to commit upon entering the home of the victim. Because the record shows no evidence that the Defendant had the intent to commit a crime other than the crimes of

terroristic threats and simple assault, the court agrees that those sentences should be vacated pursuant to 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3502(d).

Accordingly, the court hereby enters the following:

there was no actual violence involved, the statute would be unconstitutional "as applied." This would create a situation whereby every disqualifying offense would have to be relitigated. Instead, the offenses in both subsection (b) and (c) either involve actual violence or present a situation where people are exposed to violence or potential violence.

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No. 4800-2022

ORDER

AND NOW, this 5th day of May, 2025, upon consideration of Defendant's Post-Sentence Motion and the legal briefs submitted, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. The court DENIES Defendant's Motion to vacate his conviction for Person not to Possess firearm; and
2. The court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to vacate his sentences for terroristic threats and simple assault.

BY THE COURT:

S/JEFFREY A. CONRAD, JUDGE

ATTEST:

CC: Christopher Tallarico, Esquire (Chief Public Defender)
Mary Jean Glick, Esquire (Senior Assistant Public Defender)
Christopher Miller, Esquire, (Assistant District Attorney)

ESTATE AND TRUST NOTICES

Notice is hereby given that, in the estates of the decedents set forth below, the Register of Wills has granted letters testamentary or of administration to the persons named. Notice is also hereby given of the existence of the trusts of the deceased settlors set forth below for whom no personal representatives have been appointed within 90 days of death. All persons having claims or demands against said estates or trusts are requested to make known the same, and all persons indebted to said estates or trusts are requested to make payment, without delay, to the executors or administrators or trustees or to their attorneys named below.

FIRST PUBLICATION

Biers, Carl H., Jr. a/k/a Carl Hayward Biers, Jr., dec'd.

Late of West Lampeter Township.

Executor/Trustee: Jeffrey C. Biers c/o Aevitas Law, PLLC, 275 Hess Blvd., Suite 101, Lancaster, PA 17601.

Attorneys: Neil R. Vestermark, Esquire, Aevitas Law, PLLC.

Borgersen, Mary M., dec'd.

Late of Lititz Borough.

Executor: Karin B. Yard c/o Young and Young, 44 S. Main Street, P.O. Box 126, Manheim, PA 17545.

Attorneys: Young and Young.

Brunner, John K., dec'd.

Late of Elizabethtown.

Co-Executrices: Wendy Penica and Gail Sheaffer Rados c/o Heather D. Royer, Esquire, JOHNSON DUFFIE, 301 Market

Street, Lemoyne, PA 17043.

Attorney: Heather D. Royer, Esquire.

Chen, Philip M. a/k/a Philip Minkang Chen, dec'd.

Late of East Hempfield Township.

Executor: Nancy M. Chen c/o Nikolaus & Hohenadel, LLP, 212 North Queen Street, Lancaster, PA 17603.

Attorney: Barbara Reist Dillon.

Dolly, Borden William, Jr., dec'd.

Late of Lancaster.

Executor: Bruce William Dolly c/o W. Bryan Byler, Byler & Winkle, P.C., 363 West Roseville Road, Lancaster, PA 17601.

Attorney: W. Bryan Byler, Esq.

Dunn, Stella L. a/k/a Stella S. Dunn, dec'd.

Late of West Hempfield Township.

Executor: Scott M. Stephan c/o RKG Law, 101 North Pointe Blvd., Suite 202, Lancaster, PA 17601.

Attorney: Nichole M. Baer, Esquire.

Eckman, Robert Light, dec'd.

Late of Lancaster.

Administrator: Barbara E. Hall c/o Jeffrey C. Goss, Esquire, 480 New Holland Avenue, Suite 6205, Lancaster, PA 17602.

Attorneys: Brubaker Connaughton Goss & Lucarelli LLC.

Estep, John Hayes a/k/a John H. Estep, dec'd.

Late of Earl Township.

Executor: Vaughn D. Estep c/o Glick, Goodley, Deibler & Fanning, LLP, 131 W. Main Street, New Holland, PA 17557.

Attorney: Ashley A. Glick, Esq., Glick, Goodley, Deibler & Fanning, LLP.

Forsythe, Thelma L. a/k/a Thelma Louise Forsythe, dec'd.

Late of Ephrata.

Executors: Jonathan P. Forsythe, 485 Bridgeport Avenue F, Milford, CT 06460 and David M. Forsythe, 4764 Dunham Drive, Reading, PA 19606.

Attorney: Layne R. Oden, Esquire, Layne R. Oden Attorney and Counselor at Law PC, Nine South Main Street, Muncy, PA 17756.

Gable, Deborah M. a/k/a Deborah Gable, dec'd.

Late of West Lampeter Township.

Executors: Katherine Uhler and Kathy Shaub c/o Appel Yost LLP, 33 North Duke Street, Lancaster, PA 17602.

Attorney: James K. Noel, IV, Esquire.

Johnston, Marian Frances a/k/a Marian F. Johnston, dec'd.

Late of Lancaster Township.

Administratrix: Catherine W. Weaver c/o Angelo J. Fiorentino, Attorney, P.O. Box 5349, Lancaster, PA 17606.

Attorneys: Gibbel Kraybill & Hess LLP.

Kubik, Janet, dec'd.

Late of East Drumore Township. Administrator: Shirley Davis c/o Miller Law Firm, 718 Poplar Street, Suite I, Lebanon, PA 17042.

Attorney: Steven D.W. Miller, Esquire.

Neff, Marian M., dec'd.

Late of East Drumore Township. Executor: Carol J. Horst c/o James Clark Associates, 277 Millwood Road, Lancaster, PA 17603.

Attorney: Neil R. Vestermark.

Rosado, Alejandro, dec'd.

Late of West Lampeter Township.

Executor: Irene Prescott c/o Good Law Firm, 132 West Main Street, New Holland, PA 17557.

Attorneys: Good Law Firm.

Russo, Eloise a/k/a Eloise May Russo, dec'd.

Late of Penn Township.

Administrator: Darryl John Russo c/o Aevitas Law, PLLC, 275 Hess Blvd., Suite 101, Lancaster, PA 17601.

Attorneys: Neil R. Vestermark, Esquire, Aevitas Law, PLLC.

Snyder, Roy E., dec'd.

Late of Providence Township.

Executors: David G. Byers and Carol A. Byers c/o James Clark Associates, 277 Millwood Road, Lancaster, PA 17603.

Attorney: Neil R. Vestermark.

Stuckey, Marilyn E., dec'd.

Late of Manor Township.

Executor: Joseph G. Salamo c/o 327 Locust Street, Columbia, PA 17512.

Attorney: Michael S. Grab, Esquire, Nikolaus & Hohenadel, LLP, 327 Locust Street, Columbia, PA 17512.

SECOND PUBLICATION

Amico, Jean M., dec'd.

Late of East Hempfield Township.

Administratrix: Denise Glat-

felter c/o David P. Carson, 2013
State Street, Suite 203, East Pe-
tersburg, PA 17520.
Attorney: David P. Carson.

Beard, Gloria A., dec'd.
Late of Denver Borough.
Executrix: Tammy A. Miller c/o
Gardner and Stevens, P.C., 109
West Main Street, Ephrata, PA
17522.
Attorney: John C. Stevens.

Burk, Jacqueline C., dec'd.
Late of Lancaster City.
Executor: Carol J. Dundore c/o
RKG Law, 101 North Pointe
Boulevard, Suite 202, Lancast-
er, PA 17601.
Attorney: Makayla D. Gilchrist.

Candel, James A., dec'd.
Late of Columbia Borough.
Executor: Jennifer L. Lilly c/o
327 Locust Street, Columbia,
PA 17512.
Attorney: Michael S. Grab, Es-
quire, Nikolaus & Hohenadel,
LLP, 327 Locust Street, Colum-
bia, PA 17512.

Canning, Marianne S., dec'd.
Late of Elizabethtown Borough.
Co-Executors: Charles C. Can-
ning, 206 Polecat Road, Centre
Hall, PA 16828 and Karen M.
Moussa, 245 Mud College Road,
Littlestown, PA 17340.
Attorney: None.

Cogan, Marie C., dec'd.
Late of Manheim.
Executrix: Anne Cogan, 112
Hart Street, Manheim, PA
17545.
Attorney: None.

Cook, Louella O. a/k/a Louella

O'Kane Cook, dec'd.
Late of West Hempfield Town-
ship.
Executrix: Pamela J. Bervin-
chak, 828 Christine Lane, Lan-
caster, PA 17601.
Attorney: None.

Eck, Bonnie J., dec'd.
Late of West Hempfield Town-
ship.
Executor: Gerard T. Eck c/o
Steven R. Blair, Attorney at Law,
650 Delp Road, Lancaster, PA
17601.
Attorney: Steven R. Blair, Esq.

Eshleman, Charlotte P., dec'd.
Late of Providence Township.
Executor: Kimberly L. Toschlog
c/o Appel Yost LLP, 33 North
Duke Street, Lancaster, PA
17602.
Attorney: Jeffrey P. Ouellet, Es-
quire.

Evrard, Ella A., dec'd.
Late of Columbia Borough.
Executors: Carol A. Martin and
Betty M. Bailey c/o 327 Locust
Street, Columbia, PA 17512.
Attorney: Michael S. Grab, Es-
quire, Nikolaus & Hohenadel,
LLP, 327 Locust Street, Colum-
bia, PA 17512.

Fisher, Ammon S., dec'd.
Late of Eden Township.
Executors: David E. Fisher and
David F. Stoltzfus c/o Glick,
Goodley, Deibler & Fanning,
LLP, 131 W. Main Street, New
Holland, PA 17557.
Attorney: Ashley A. Glick, Es-
quire, Glick, Goodley, Deibler &
Fanning, LLP.

Gochnauer, Edwin C., Sr., dec'd.

Late of East Petersburg Borough.

Executor: Edwin C. Gochnauer, Jr. c/o Young and Young, 44 S. Main Street, P.O. Box 126, Manheim, PA 17545.

Attorneys: Young and Young.

Good, Joanne W., dec'd.

Late of Brecknock Township.

Executors: Geraldine H. Good and Clair B. Good c/o Beiler Legal Services PC, 105 South Hoover Avenue, New Holland, PA 17557.

Attorney: Nevin D. Beiler, Esquire.

Hurst, Grace M., dec'd.

Late of Terre Hill Borough.

Executor: Ivan M. Reiff c/o Beiler Legal Services PC, 105 South Hoover Avenue, New Holland, PA 17557.

Attorney: Nevin D. Beiler, Esquire.

Luciano, Carlos M., dec'd.

Late of Ephrata Township.

Executor: Blanche I. Luciano c/o John H. May, Esquire, 49 North Duke Street, Lancaster, PA 17602.

Attorneys: May, Herr & Grosh, LLP.

Martin, Annabel F., dec'd.

Late of Ephrata Township.

Executrix: Cheryl D. Pfautz c/o Justin J. Bollinger, Attorney, P.O. Box 5349, Lancaster, PA 17606.

Attorneys: Gibbel Kraybill & Hess LLP.

Metzler, Donald L., dec'd.

Late of Providence Township.

Executrix: Tracey L. Metzler, c/o

Nikolaus & Hohenadel, LLP, 303 West Fourth Street, Quarryville, PA 17566.

Attorney: John C. Hohenadel, Esquire.

Meyers, Dorothy M., dec'd.

Late of West Lampeter Township.

Executor: Fulton Bank, N.A. c/o John H. May, Esquire, 49 North Duke Street, Lancaster, PA 17602.

Attorneys: May, Herr & Grosh, LLP.

Miller, Larry L., dec'd.

Late of East Lampeter Township.

Executor: Judy M. Bannon c/o Young and Young, 44 S. Main Street, P.O. Box 126, Manheim, PA 17545.

Attorneys: Young and Young.

Neuhauser, Richard Paul, dec'd.

Late of Lancaster.

Executrix: Valerie Stewart c/o Goodman & Kenneff, 460 North George Street, Millersville, PA 17551.

Attorney: Joseph J. Kenneff, Esquire.

Querry, Connie E., dec'd.

Late of Conoy Township.

Executrices: Cherri A. DeGroat and Maggie L. Edgell c/o Young and Young, 44 S. Main Street, P.O. Box 126, Manheim, PA 17545.

Attorneys: Young and Young.

Robison, Gerald A., Jr. a/k/a Gerald A. Robison a/k/a Gerald Robison, dec'd.

Late of Elizabethtown.

Executor: Gerald Austin Robi-

son, III, 9453 Billwood Highway,
Dimondale, MI 48821.
Attorney: None.

Shreiner, Dorothea, dec'd.

Late of Lititz Borough.
Executor: Keith R. Shreiner
c/o Gible Law Offices, P.C.,
126 East Main Street, Lititz, PA
17543.
Attorney: Stephen R. Gible.

Smucker, Susie K., dec'd.

Late of Bart Township.
Executors: Henry B. Smucker
and Samuel B. Smucker c/o
Glick, Goodley, Deibler & Fan-
ning, LLP, 131 W. Main Street,
New Holland, PA 17557.
Attorney: Patrick A. Deibler,
Esq., Glick, Goodley, Deibler &
Fanning, LLP.

Stoltzfoos, Barbara B., dec'd.

Late of West Earl Township.
Executor: Stephen Z. Stoltz-
foos c/o Glick, Goodley, Deibler
& Fanning, LLP, 131 W. Main
Street, New Holland, PA 17557.
Attorney: Ashley A. Glick, Esq.,
Glick, Goodley, Deibler & Fan-
ning, LLP.

Swinehart, Wanda J., dec'd.

Late of Manheim Township.
Executors: Tanya Jean Benner
and Sherri Lynn Carpenter c/o
Young and Young, 44 S. Main
Street, P.O. Box 126, Manheim,
PA 17545.
Attorneys: Young and Young.

Taylor, Joann, dec'd.

Late of West Lampeter Town-
ship.
Administrator: Justin B. Tay-
lor c/o Emily C. Watkins, Es-
quire, Barley Snyder LLP, 126

East King Street, Lancaster, PA
17602.

Attorney: Emily C. Watkins --
Barley Snyder LLP.

THIRD PUBLICATION

**Althouse, Anna R. a/k/a Anna
Althouse**, dec'd.

Late of Denver Borough.
Executor: Curtis L. Althouse c/o
Lindsay M. Schoeneberger, RKG
Law, 108 West Main Street,
Ephrata, PA 17522.
Attorney: Lindsay M. Schoene-
berger.

**Anderson, David R. a/k/a David
Richmond Anderson**, dec'd.

Late of Manheim Township.
Executrix: Maria L. Tickner, c/o
Thomas M. Gish, Sr., Attorney,
P.O. Box 5349, Lancaster, PA
17606.
Attorneys: Gibbel Kraybill &
Hess, LLP.

**Bowman, Lois J. a/k/a Lois
Jane Bowman**, dec'd.

Late of East Hempfield Town-
ship.
Executrix: Sue A. Bowman c/o
Nikolaus & Hohenadel, LLP, 212
North Queen Street, Lancaster,
PA 17603.
Attorney: Barbara Reist Dillon.

Fry, Anna V., dec'd.

Late of Manheim Township.
Executrix: Dana M. Lichty c/o
Thomas M. Gish, Sr., Attorney,
P.O. Box 5349, Lancaster, PA
17606.
Attorneys: Gibbel Kraybill &
Hess, LLP.

Geier, Brian L., dec'd.

Late of Salisbury Township.
Administratrix: Patricia A. Gei-

er c/o Law Office of Gretchen M. Curran, LLC, 1337 Byerland Church Road, P.O. Box 465, Willow Street, PA 17584.
Attorney: Gretchen M. Curran.

Griffith, Mary Stahl a/k/a Mary E. Griffith, dec'd.

Late of East Donegal Township.
Executrix: Jennifer Williams c/o Marci S. Miller, Attorney, P.O. Box 5349, Lancaster, PA 17606.
Attorneys: Gibbel Kraybill & Hess LLP.

Groff, Charles O., dec'd.

Late of Mount Joy Borough.
Executor: Tracee L. Groff c/o May Herr & Grosh LLP, 50 East Main Street, Mount Joy, PA 17552.
Attorney: Scott E. Albert, Esq.

Hazouri, Pamela E., dec'd.

Late of Strasburg Township.
Executor: Shannon R. Waychoff c/o Young and Young, 44 S. Main Street, P.O. Box 126, Manheim, PA 17545.
Attorneys: Young and Young.

James, Doris R. a/k/a Doris June James a/k/a Doris Robinson James, dec'd.

Late of Lancaster Township.
Executrix: Jocelyn L. James c/o Mongiovi Law, LLC, 235 North Lime Street, Lancaster, PA 17602.
Attorney: Michael J. Mongiovi.

Kirkbride, Edward E., dec'd.

Late of Lancaster County.
Executor: Victor N. Hagerstrom, Jr., 206 Glebe Lane, Lancaster, PA 17602.
Attorney: None.

Kohr, Robert R., dec'd.

Late of Elizabethtown.
Co-Executors: Nancy M. Hitz and Perla M. Berry c/o George W. Porter, Esquire, 909 East Chocolate Avenue, Hershey, PA 17033.
Attorney: George W. Porter, Esquire.

Kramer, Barbara S., dec'd.

Late of East Hempfield Township.
Executor: Phillip Reilly c/o Young and Young, 44 S. Main Street, P.O. Box 126, Manheim, PA 17545.
Attorneys: Young and Young.

Minnick, Sharon L., dec'd.

Late of Manor Township.
Executor: Cori Steiner c/o May Herr & Grosh, LLP, 234 North Duke Street, Lancaster, PA 17602.
Attorney: Matthew A. Grosh.

Sauder, Janet F., dec'd.

Late of Manor Township.
Administrator: Anthony Caswell c/o Thomas W. Fleckenstein, Esquire, 553 Locust Street, Columbia, PA 17512.
Attorneys: Mountz, Kreiser & Fleckenstein, 553 Locust Street, Columbia, PA 17512.

Schaffner, Patsy L., dec'd.

Late of Mount Joy Township.
Executor: Lloyd A. Schaffner, III c/o May Herr & Grosh LLP, 50 East Main Street, Mount Joy, PA 17552.
Attorney: Scott E. Albert, Esq.

Schaum, Edith Mae, dec'd.

Late of Manheim Township.
Executrix: Paula L. Smith c/o

Law Office of Shawn Pierson,
105 East Oregon Road, Lititz,
PA 17543.

Attorney: Shawn M. Pierson,
Esq.

Shreiner, Louise H., dec'd.

Late of Warwick Township.

Executor: James M. Shreiner,
Jr. c/o Douglas A. Smith, Attor-
ney, P.O. Box 5349, Lancaster,
PA 17606.

Attorneys: Gibbel Kraybill &
Hess LLP.

**Vaitl, Elisabeth H. a/k/a Elisa-
beth Vaitl,** dec'd.

Late of Ephrata Borough.

Executrix: Tanya E.B. Wor-
ley c/o Glick, Goodley, Deibler
& Fanning, LLP, 131 W. Main
Street, New Holland, PA 17557.

Attorney: Ashley A. Glick, Esq.,
Glick, Goodley, Deibler & Fan-
ning, LLP.

**Wardrop, Virginia R. a/k/a Vir-
ginia M. Wardrop,** dec'd.

Late of Manheim Township.

Executrix: Jamie A. Brown c/o
Nicholas T. Gard, Esquire, 121
E. Main Street, New Holland, PA
17557.

Attorneys: Smoker Gard Associ-
ates LLP.

Winey, Edith M., dec'd.

Late of East Lampeter Town-
ship.

Administrator: A. Phillip Winey
c/o Nikolaus & Hohenadel, LLP,
222 S. Market St., Suite 201,
Elizabethtown, PA 17022.

Attorney: John M. Smith, Es-
quire.

Wolf, Diana Lynn, dec'd.

Late of Lancaster City.

Administrator: Cynthia Lynn
Thomas c/o Legacy Legal Plan-
ning, 10490 Little Patuxent
Parkway, Suite 600, Columbia,
MD 21044.

Attorney: Laura Lynn Thomas,
Esquire.

Young, Barbara L., dec'd.

Late of Manheim Township.

Co-Executrices: Lee Ann Young
and Kristine L. Young c/o Ann
L. Martin, Attorney, P.O. Box
5349, Lancaster, PA 17606.

Attorneys: Gibbel Kraybill &
Hess LLP.

CHANGE OF NAME NOTICES

Notice is hereby given that the
Petition of James Robert Ritter,
Jr., a minor, by Elizabeth Marie
Earhart was filed with the Court
of Common Pleas of Lancaster
County, Pennsylvania, docketed
to number CI-25-03454, pray-
ing to change the name of **James
Robert Ritter, Jr.** to James Rob-
ert Earhart.

A Hearing will be held on said
Petition on August 14, 2025, at
2:45 p.m. in Courtroom No. 11 of
the Lancaster County Courthouse,
50 North Duke Street, Lancaster,
Pennsylvania, at which time any
persons interested may attend
and show cause, if any, why the
prayer of the Petition should not
be granted.

A-1, 8

Notice is hereby given that the
Petition of Conner Alexander Rit-
ter, a minor, by Elizabeth Marie
Earhart was filed with the Court
of Common Pleas of Lancaster
County, Pennsylvania, docketed
to number CI-25-03459, praying
to change the name of **Conner Al-**

exander Ritter to Conner Alexander Earhart.

A Hearing will be held on said Petition on August 14, 2025, at 2:30 p.m. in Courtroom No. 11 of the Lancaster County Courthouse, 50 North Duke Street, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, at which time any persons interested may attend and show cause, if any, why the prayer of the Petition should not be granted.

A-1, 8

DISSOLUTION NOTICES

Notice is hereby given that the shareholders and directors of **Universal Poly Products, Ltd.**, a Pennsylvania corporation, with an address at 260 Jalyn Drive, New Holland, PA 17557, have approved a proposal that the corporation voluntarily dissolve, and that the Board of Directors is now engaged in winding up and settling the affairs of the corporation under the provisions of Section 1975 of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law of 1988, as amended.

GIBBEL KRAYBILL & HESS LLP
Attorneys

A-1

Notice is hereby given that the shareholders and directors of **Master-Link Supply, Inc.**, a Pennsylvania corporation, with a registered office address at 440 Concrete Avenue, Leola, PA 17540, have approved a proposal that the corporation voluntarily dissolve, and that the Board of Directors is now engaged in winding up and settling the affairs of the corporation under the provisions of Section 1975 of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law of

1988, as amended.

GIBBEL KRAYBILL & HESS LLP
Attorneys

A-1

FICTITIOUS NAME NOTICES

Zania Bailey did file in the office of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on 7/7/2025, registration of the name:

“Stillness and Flow Yoga”

under which she intends to do business at 52 Hess Rd Quarryville, PA.

A-1

Notice is hereby given that Hollingshead Construction LLC, 351 Dead End Road, Lititz, PA 17543, did file in the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on July 8, 2025, registration of the name:

“FOAM SOLUTIONS LLC”

under which it intends to do business at 3 51 Dead End Road, Lititz PA 17543, pursuant to the provisions of the Act of Assembly of December 16, 1982, Chapter 3, known as the “Fictitious Name Act”.

Nicholas T. Gard, Esquire,
Smoker Gard

A-1

ORPHANS’ COURT NOTICE

**IN THE COURT OF
COMMON PLEAS OF
CHESTER COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHANS’ COURT DIVISION**

IN RE: J.O.R.

Case Number: AD-25-0014

TO: CHARLES ALICEA-GRAY

Petitions have been filed by Chester County Department of Children, Youth and Families asking the Orphans' Court to put an end to all rights you and Caprice Oceana Robertson have to a male/female minor child, J.O.R. (d.o.b. 11/15/12), and to show cause why the parental rights to this child should not be terminated involuntarily. The Court has awarded Citations on these Petitions for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights.

The Court has set a Call of the List for September 2, 2025, at 9:00 o'clock A.M., Honorable John L. Hall in Court Room No. 5, Chester County Justice Center, 201 West Market Street, West Chester, Pennsylvania, to determine which day your case will be heard, and to show cause, if any you have, why the relief sought in the Petition should not be granted. You or your lawyer should be present at the Call of the List to find out the specific date that your case will be heard.

If neither you nor your lawyer appears for the Call of the List, you may not find out when your hearing will be.

You are warned that even if you fail to appear at the scheduled hearing, the hearing will go on without you and your rights to this child may be ended by the court without your being present. You have a right to be represented at the hearing by a lawyer. You should take this paper to your lawyer at once. If you do not have a lawyer or cannot afford one, go

to or telephone the Lawyer Reference Service, Chester County Bar Association, 15 West Gay Street, West Chester, PA 19380, Telephone No. (610) 429-1500 to find out where you can get legal help.

You have an important option that may be available to you under Pennsylvania Law. Act 101 of 2010 permits the adoptive parents, child, birth parents and/or relatives to enter into a voluntary Post-Adoption Contact Agreement for continuing contact or communication following a child's adoption. Contact Chester County Department of Children, Youth, 601 Westtown Road, St. 310, PO Box 2747, West Chester, PA 19380-0990 or phone 610-344-5800.

Ju-25, A-1, 8

SUITS ENTERED

Defendant's name appears first in capitals, followed by plaintiff's name, number and plaintiff's or appellant's attorney.

July 16, 2025
to July 21, 2025

ADVANCED MANAGEMENT SERVICES LLC, COMMUNITY SERVICES GROUP INC, ADVANCED METRICS, BELL, ADAM, TROUT, GARRETT, BLUE, SUSAN, HARTL, ALAN, MURPHY, MICHAEL, CSG; Steven R. Herr; 05342; Harter

ADVANCED METRICS, COMMUNITY SERVICES GROUP INC, ADVANCE MANAGEMENT SERVICES LLC; Meghan Ann O'Meara; 05344; Harter

AK MARBLE & GRANITE LLC; IGM Surfaces LLC; 05454; Keifer AMERICOLD LOGISTRICS LLC;

Timothy Boyer; 05364; Dion
BLOSSOM MEDSPA LLC, LI-
CATESE, ALYSSA; ODK CAPITAL
LLC; 05317; SHARIF

BLOSSOM MEDSPA LLC, LI-
CATESE, ALYSSA; ODK CAPITAL
LLC; 05320; SHARIF

CAMPBELL, LUANNE; LVNV
Funding LLC; 05448; Carfagno

CASTRENZE, JOSEPH ALAN;
First Portfolio Ventures LLC;
05439; Tsarouhis

CATANZARO, THOMAS; Troy
Capital LLC; 05472; Tsarouhis

COLLINS, PATRICIA C, AN-
THELL MASLOW & MACMINN
LLP; Gary S Hunter; 05464

HORNING, DWIGHT, HORNING,
DORA, GILLS, CYNTHIA; Diane L.
Sylvester; 05312; White

JARVIS, NICOLE P; Ford Mo-
tor Credit Company LLC; 05438;
Klemm

KENYI, JAPHETH M, ELL, MI-
CHELLE, NEW AGE SPACES LTD,

MICHELLE, ACEL TECHNOLO-
GIES LLC LTD, ACEL TECHNOL-
OGIES LLP LTD; Gary S. Hunter;
05463

KOENIG, JENNIFER; Citadel
Federal Credit Union; 05348; Lar-
kin

LEHMAN, MATTHEW R, RO-
MAN, ANNALISE N; Hawthorne
Gardens LLC; 05467; Sklar

LOPEZ, PABLO ROQUE; Ronald
R. Jones, Jr; 05351; Larsen

MARTIN, CAROL; Velocity In-
vestments LLC; 05336; Tsarouhis
NEFF, RYAN; LVNV Funding
LLC; 05449; Carfagno

OXLAJ GUZMAN, EVELIN; Ru-
perto Pagan Perez; 05441; McEl-
venney

PA DEPARTMENT OF TRANS-
PORTATION; Rhiannon Lee En-
ck-Polaski; 05371; Pfursich

PA DEPARTMENT OF TRANS-
PORTATION; Jacob Jeffrey Um-
berger; 05421



The poster is designed to look like a piece of torn paper pinned to a corkboard. It features the Lancaster Bar Association logo, which is a red geometric design. The text on the poster reads: "LANCASTER BAR ASSOCIATION", "2025 FAMILY LAW SUMMIT", and "October 7, 2025". To the right of the main text, there is a smaller piece of paper that says "SCAN BELOW TO SAVE TO YOUR CALENDAR" with an arrow pointing to a QR code.