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IN THIS ISSUE

STARLING VS. LAKE MEADE



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SHERIFF'S SALE

AUG 5TH SALE CONTINUED TO:

IN PURSUANCE of a Writ of Execution, Judgment No. 11-S-0308 issuing out of Court of Common Pleas Adams County, and to me directed, will be exposed to Public Sale on Friday, the 7th day of October 2011, at 10:00 o'clock in the forencon at the Sheriff's Office located in the Courthouse, Borough of Gettysburg, Adams County, PA, the following Real Estate, viz.:

SHORT DESCRIPTION

By virtue of Writ of Execution

No. 11-S-0308

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

VS.

CLAUDE E. CARMAN

211 SCHOOL HOUSE HILL ROAD FAYETTEVILLE, PA 17222

FRANKLIN TOWNSHIP

Parcel No.: <u>12-110-7A</u>
IMPROVEMENTS THEREON:

RESIDENTIAL DWELLING

JUDGMENT AMOUNT: \$66,637.24

Attorneys for Plaintiff PURCELL, KRUG & HALLER 717-234-4178

SEIZED and taken into execution as the property of **Claude E. Carman** and to be sold by me.

James W. Muller-Sheriff Sheriff's Office, Gettysburg, PA

TO ALL PARTIES IN INTEREST AND CLAIMANTS: You are notified that a schedule of distribution will be filed by the Sheriff in his office on October 28, 2011, and distribution will be made in accordance with said schedule, unless exceptions are filed thereto within 20 days after the filing thereof. Purchaser must settle for property on or before filing date.

ALL claims to property must be filed with Sheriff before sale date.

As soon as the property is declared sold to the highest bidder, 20% of the purchase price or all of the cost, whichever may be the higher, shall be paid forthwith to the Sheriff.

8/5, 12 & 19

NOTICE

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Board of Directors of the Adams County Transit Authority, Adams County, Pennsylvania, at a meeting duly called and held on July 26, 2011, approved the proposed Application for Joinder to set forth the terms and conditions of joining with the York County Transportation Authority, a Pennsylvania municipal authority, with offices in York County, Pennsylvania under the provisions of 53 Pa. C.S. Section 5604(b)-(c) of the Municipal Authorities Act and that, as a result of the proposed merger, to become effective with the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on August 15, 2011, the name of the merged entities shall be YORK-ADAMS TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY.

> Timothy J. Bupp, Esq. CGA Law Firm 135 North George St. York, PA 17401 717-848-4900

8/5

FICTITIOUS NAME NOTICE

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, pursuant to the provisions of the Fictitious 1982-295, approved Names Act December 16, 1982, of the filing on July 21, 2011, in the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, at Harrisburg, PA, of a certificate for the conduct of a business under the fictitious name of FITNESS 4 YOUTH, with its principal place of business at 44C South Franklin Street, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania 17325. The name and address of the entity owning or interested in said business is Gettysburg Isshinryu Karate, LLC, of the same address.

> Teeter, Teeter & Teeter 108 West Middle Street Gettysburg, PA 17325 717-334-2195

8/5

STARLING VS. LAKE MEADE

- 1. To determine if a complaint fails for insufficient specificity, the main inquiry is whether the complaint is sufficiently clear to enable the defendant to prepare his defense.
- 2. To determine if a complaint fails for legal insufficiency (demurrer), the court may only determine whether, on the basis of the allegations the plaintiff pled, the plaintiff possesses a cause of action recognizable at law.
- 3. Trespass is the intentional entry upon the land of another without privilege. To recover on an action for trespass, the plaintiff must prove ownership of or title to the land and possession or the right to immediate possession at the time of the alleged trespass.
- 4. The purpose of an ejectment action, as opposed to an action to quiet title, is not to determine the relative and respective rights of all potential title holders, but rather the immediate rights between plaintiff and defendant involved in that particular litigation.
- 5. To establish a private nuisance claim, a landowner must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was the legal cause of the invasion and that the defendant's conduct was intentional and unreasonable or reckless, negligent, or abnormally dangerous.
- 6. Pennsylvania's Declaratory Judgment Act gives courts the power to declare rights, status and other legal relations. The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County, Pennsylvania, Civil, No. 10-S-498, W. LOWELL STARLING AND NANCY STARLING VS. LAKE MEADE PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.

Ronald L. Finck, Esq., for Plaintiffs Kevin M. Skjoldal, Esq., for Defendant Campbell, J., March 8, 2011

OPINION

Plaintiffs, W. Lowell Starling and Nancy Starling, initiated this action by filing a Praecipe to Issue Writ of Summons on March 25, 2010. Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendant, Lake Meade Property Owners Association, Inc. ("LMPOA"), on April 15, 2010. Defendant then filed Preliminary Objections. In response to Defendant's Preliminary Objections, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on June 7, 2010. Defendant then filed Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. By Opinion and Order dated September 24, 2010, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint without prejudice and granted Plaintiffs twenty (20) days to file a Second Amended Complaint.

On October 21, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint wherein they allege Trespass (Count I), Ejectment (Count II), and Nuisance (Count III). Plaintiffs also seek a Declaratory Judgment

(Counts IV & V). In response to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Defendant filed Preliminary Objections on November 9, 2010, and a Brief in Support of its Preliminary Objections on November 19, 2010. Plaintiffs filed a Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Preliminary Objections on December 9, 2010. This Court held oral argument on Defendant's Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint on January 12, 2011.

It is well established under Pennsylvania law that when ruling on preliminary objections, the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of material fact as well as all inferences reasonably deducible from those facts. *Ballroom, LLC v. Commonwealth*, 984 A.2d 582, 586 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (citations omitted). Preliminary objections will be sustained only where the case is clear and free from doubt. *Rambo v. Greene*, 906 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. Super. 2006).

Defendant presently raises several Preliminary Objections pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028. First, Defendant argues that each count of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint fails to conform to law or rule of court under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(a)(2). A complaint may fail to conform with a rule of law or court if it does not provide the requisite facts pursuant to Pennsylvania law. "Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state; a complaint must not only give the defendant notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, but the complaint must also formulate the issues by summarizing those facts essential to support the claim." *Lerner v. Lerner*, 954 A.2d 1229, 1235 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

Defendant also alleges that each count of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint lacks sufficient specificity under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(a)(3). To determine if a complaint fails for insufficient specificity, the main inquiry is whether the complaint is sufficiently clear to enable the defendant to prepare his defense. *Rambo v. Greene*, 906 A.2d 1232, 1236 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation and quotations omitted).

Defendant next alleges that each count of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint is legally insufficient under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(a)(4). To determine if a complaint fails for legal insufficiency (demurrer), the court may only determine whether, on the basis of the allegations the plaintiff pled, the plaintiff possesses

a cause of action recognizable at law. *In re Adoption of S.P.T.*, 783 A.2d 779, 782 (Pa. Super. 2001). The court may not consider factual matters, no testimony or other evidence outside the complaint may be adduced, and the court may not address the merits of the matters represented in the complaint. *Id.*

Finally, Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs' trespass claim in Count I and nuisance claim in Count II in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint contains impertinent matter under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(a)(2). To be scandalous or impertinent matter, the allegations must be immaterial and inappropriate to the proof of the cause of action. *Common Cause/Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth*, 710 A.2d 108, 115 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (citation omitted). In light of the above standards, an examination of each of the counts contained in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint is necessary.

Plaintiffs' first claim is trespass. Trespass is the intentional entry upon the land of another without privilege. *Nido v. Chambers*, 70 Pa. D. & C.2d 129, 132 (C.P. Lawr. Sept. 17, 1975). One who authorizes or directs another to commit an act which constitutes a trespass to another's land is himself liable as a trespasser to the same extent as if the trespass were committed directly by himself. *Kopka v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa.*, 91 A.2d 232, 235 (Pa. 1952). Finally, to recover on an action for trespass, the plaintiff must prove ownership of or title to the land and possession or the right to immediate possession at the time of the alleged trespass. *Hartley v. Spencer*, 75 Pa. Super. 449 (1921).

Instantly, Plaintiffs have alleged title and ownership to a parcel of real estate in the Lake Meade subdivision situate at the peninsula on the lake, including a narrow strip of unimproved realty located on the west side of Custer Drive between Custer Drive and Lake Meade. In support of their ownership of the narrow strip of unimproved realty located on the west side of Custer Drive, Plaintiffs allege that the Lake Meade Subdivision consisted of 1097.24 acres and prior to its subdivision, it was owned by Lake Meade, Inc. (Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9-11, Ex. C). Plaintiffs point to the chain of title dating back to 1967, when the land was deeded from a common grantor, Lake Meade, Inc. Plaintiffs also have attached deeds supporting their theory of the chain of title. (Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25-41, Exs. C, F, G, H, I, J). Plaintiffs also have attached a copy of the Adams County tax map to support their assertion that their property

includes the narrow strip of land to the west of Custer Drive. (Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40-41, Ex. X).¹

Plaintiffs have alleged trespass by Defendant, the Lake Mead Property Owners Association, itself. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that in 2002 Defendant placed a large bulletin board and garbage cans on the narrow strip of realty to the west of Custer Drive, and that in 2008 Defendant removed "No Trespassing" signs that had been placed on the narrow strip of realty to the west of Custer Drive by Plaintiffs, or Defendant directed other individuals to remove said signs.

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant has permitted or encouraged trespass upon the narrow strip of land on the west side of Custer Drive. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that they have regularly observed numerous individuals and groups fishing, picnicking, sunbathing, lounging, socializing, parking and loitering on the Plaintiffs' property, specifically the narrow strip of unimproved realty on the west side of Custer Drive and Lake Meade. According to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Defendant has prohibited and minimized those types of activities in the past in other locations within the Lake Meade community, but Defendant, its officers and agents have taken no action to remove individuals from the narrow strip of realty on the west side of Custer Drive, despite Plaintiffs' numerous complaints to Defendant and the Defendant's duty to enforce its restrictive covenants. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that in 2007, 2008 and 2009, Defendant invited the York Springs Fire Company to an Independence Day celebration on the narrow strip of land west of Custer Drive and Plaintiffs attached pictures in support of this allegation. Finally, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant has failed and refused to enforce its own rules and regulations by allowing non-Association members and guests into the Lake Meade community. Plaintiffs' reference to other individuals in their Second Amended Complaint is not an impertinent matter; rather Plaintiffs reference other individuals to support their assertion that Defendant, LMPOA, authorized other individuals to trespass upon Plaintiffs' property, either by invitation or failing to enforce rules and regulations, as discussed above. Plaintiffs have alleged facts which, if proven true, are sufficient to support a claim for trespass. Additionally,

¹ Although there may be a question as to whether or not the Plaintiffs are owners of the subject strip of land, importantly, for the purposes of reviewing preliminary objections, this court must accept Plaintiffs' averments as true and may not address the merits of Plaintiffs' claim to ownership.

the facts pleaded are sufficiently specific to enable Defendant to prepare its response. Therefore, Defendant's Preliminary Objections as to Count I – trespass are overruled.

Plaintiffs' second claim is ejectment. Ejectment is an action filed by a plaintiff, who does not possess the land but has the right to possess it, against a defendant who has actual possession. *Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Long*, 934 A.2d 76, 78 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). The purpose of an ejectment action, as opposed to an action to quiet title, is not to determine the relative and respective rights of all potential title holders, but rather the immediate rights between plaintiff and defendant involved in that particular litigation. *Id.* (citation and quotations omitted).

Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure relating to an action in ejectment provide that an action in ejectment shall proceed in accordance with the rules relating to a civil action. **Pa. R. Civ. P. 1051**. Additionally, Rule 1054, relating to specific averments and abstract of title provides:

- (a) The plaintiff shall describe the land in the complaint.
- (b) A party shall set forth in the complaint or answer an abstract of title upon which the party relies at least from the common source of the adverse titles of the parties.

Pa. R. Civ. P. 1054.

Instantly, as previously discussed, Plaintiffs, in support of their ownership of the narrow strip of unimproved realty located on the west side of Custer Drive, point to a chain of title dating back to 1967 and have attached deeds supporting their theory of the chain of title. (Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25-41, Exs. C, F, G, H, I, J). While Defendants may dispute that this chain of title includes the narrow strip of land, this is a question of fact, and, thus not a matter to be decided by preliminary objections. Plaintiffs have sufficiently described the land in their Second Amended Complaint and exhibits attached thereto. Plaintiffs have also set forth in their Second Amended Complaint the abstract of title on which they rely as their source of title to the disputed property. Reasonable inferences from Plaintiffs' Second Complaint also indicate that Defendant is allegedly in actual possession of the disputed tract of land by virtue of it placing a bulletin board on the disputed tract, removing no trespassing signs from the disputed tract, and inviting others to use the

disputed tract for recreational purposes. Therefore, Defendant's Preliminary Objections as to Count II – ejectment are overruled.

Plaintiffs' next claim is nuisance. To establish a private nuisance claim, a landowner must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was "the legal cause of the invasion and that the defendant's conduct was intentional and unreasonable or reckless, negligent, or abnormally dangerous." *Diess v. Pa. Dept. of Transp.*, 935 A.2d 895, 905 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (citing **Restatement Torts, 2d § 822**). "There is liability for nuisance only to those to whom it causes significant harm, of a kind that would be suffered by a normal person in the community or by property in normal condition used for a normal purpose." *Kembel v. Schlegel*, 478 A.2d 11, 15 (Pa. Super. 1984) (quoting **Restatement Torts, 2d § 821F**).

Instantly, as previously discussed, Plaintiffs have alleged that in 2002 Defendant placed a bulletin board on the disputed strip of land, and in 2008, Defendant removed or authorized others to remove "No Trespassing" signs placed on the narrow strip of land west of Custer Drive by Plaintiffs. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that in 2007, 2008 and 2009, Defendant invited the York Springs Fire Company to an Independence Day celebration on the narrow strip of land west of Custer Drive and Plaintiffs attached pictures in support of this allegation. Plaintiffs also have alleged that Defendant has failed and refused to enforce its own rules and regulations, specifically the bumper sticker requirement for registered vehicles and requirements for access to the community, by allowing non-Association members and guests into the Lake Meade community. Finally, Plaintiffs have alleged that they are offended by social gatherings of any nature on the disputed tract of land, as these gatherings interfere with Plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their property, and that Defendant's conduct has been intentional and unreasonable. Based on the above, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded the elements of nuisance and have provided sufficient detail to support their allegations. Plaintiffs have set forth sufficient averments to properly plead a cause of action for nuisance, and the averments are sufficiently specific for Defendant to formulate its defense. Therefore, Defendant's Preliminary Objections as to Count III – nuisance are overruled.

Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, specifically Counts IV and V, seeks relief in the form of declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Pennsylvania's Declaratory Judgment Act gives courts the "power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations." **42 Pa.**

C.S.A. § 7532. "The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding." 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7537.

In Count IV, Plaintiffs seek an order establishing the boundary line for the Starling Tract, particularly with regard to the disputed tract of land to the west of Custer Drive to which Plaintiffs claim ownership. Alternatively, Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for all real estate taxes paid by Plaintiffs for the disputed tract of land. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint sufficiently pleads a controversy between Plaintiffs and Defendant as it relates to the ownership and boundary line of the tract of land to the west of Custer Drive. (Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 68-73, 89-95, 112-115, Exs. B, M, N, O, Q, R, S, T, V, W). Disposition of the question of ownership of the strip of unimproved land on the western side of Custer drive will terminate the uncertainty as to who has the right to possession of that land. Therefore, Defendant's Preliminary Objections as to Count IV—declaratory judgment are overruled.

In Count V, Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief on the basis that there is a genuine dispute as to whether the disputed tract of land and Custer Drive can be used for non-residential purposes. Plaintiffs specifically point to the following Lake Meade Subdivision Restrictive Covenants:

"Said lots shall be used exclusively for residential purposes except those lots that may be designated for business or commercial areas on the plats by Lake Meade, Inc., subject to the right of Lake Meade Property Owners' Association to re-designate certain areas so as to insure adequate facilities for its members."

(Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 170, Ex. C).

Plaintiffs have alleged that the portion of land to the west of Custer Drive to which they claim ownership has been used for fishing, picnics, parties, fireworks, parking and socializing, none of which are residential purposes. (Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 171).² Plaintiffs have further alleged that the portion of the land to the west of Custer

² It is not for this Court to determine, at this stage of the proceedings, whether those are residential purposes in the context of the restrictive covenants for the Lake Meade community.

Drive has not been designated as business or commercial area and is not defined as a common area on the Lake Meade Subdivision Plan. (Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 172).

Plaintiffs also point to the following restrictive covenant:

No noxious or offensive trade or activity shall be permitted on any lot, nor shall anything be done thereon which shall be or become, an annoyance or nuisance to the neighborhood.

(Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 173, Ex. C).3

According to Plaintiffs, even if Defendant is found to own the portion of land in dispute, its purposes are limited to residential purposes only. (Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 174). Moreover, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant has been using and permitting its members to use Custer Drive for purposes other than vehicular travel in violation of the restrictive covenants. (Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 175). Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs request a decree permanently enjoining Defendant from using Custer Drive for anything other than vehicular travel, a decree enjoining Defendant from using the disputed portion of property for non-residential purposes, and any other relief this Court deems proper. Plaintiffs have alleged specific conduct by Defendant which Plaintiffs allege violates the restrictive covenants that govern the Lake Meade Subdivision, thus demonstrating a controversy as it relates to enforcement of the restrictive covenants. Therefore, Defendant's Preliminary Objections as to Count V- declaratory judgment are overruled.

For the reasons set forth herein, the attached Order overruling Defendant's Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint is entered.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 8th day of March, 2011, Defendant's Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint are overruled. Defendant shall file an Answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint within twenty (20) days from the date of this Order.

³ Likewise, the issue of whether the complained of activity is noxious or offensive or is an annoyance or nuisance to the neighborhood is a factual issue not presently before the court.

ESTATE NOTICES

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that in the estates of the decedents set forth below the Register of Wills has granted letters, testamentary or of administration, to the persons named. All persons having claims or demands against said estates are requested to make known the same, and all persons indebted to said estates are requested to make payment without delay to the executors or administrators or their attorneys named below.

FIRST PUBLICATION

- ESTATE OF THELMA W. BLOCHER, DEC'D
 - Late of Menallen Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania
 - Co-Executors: Jeanne A. Bunty, 796 Mt. Tabor Rd., Gardners, PA 17324; Timothy E. Willman, 3 Clear Spring Rd., Dillsburg, PA 17019
 - Attorney: Chester G. Schultz, Esq., 145 Baltimore Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325

ESTATE OF FRANCES M. BOLLINGER, DEC'D

- Late of the Borough of Gettysburg, Adams County, Pennsylvania
- Executor: Charles W. Knox, 561 SW Whitetail Circle, Lake City, FL 32024
- Attorney: Chester G. Schultz, Esq., 145 Baltimore Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325

ESTATE OF E. GEORGE COLEMAN, DEC'D

- Late of Cumberland Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania
- Executor: Larry D. Coleman, 3286 Carlisle Rd., Gardners, PA 17324
- ESTATE OF JAMES THOMAS GIST a/k/a JAMES T. GIST, DEC'D
 - Late of Germany Township, Adams
 - County, Pennsylvania Executor: Allen G. Harris, 2627 Charity
- Way, Hanover, PA 17331
 ESTATE OF HELEN M. SMITH. DEC'D
 - Late of Conewago Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania
 - Executrices: Helen L. Lentz and Barbara A. Gotwalt, c/o D.J. Hart, Esq., Guthrie, Nonemaker, Yingst & Hart, LLP, 40 York Street, Hanover, PA 17331
 - Attorney: D.J. Hart, Esq., Guthrie, Nonemaker, Yingst & Hart, LLP, 40 York Street, Hanover, PA 17331

ESTATE OF RUTHANNA I. WALLACE, DEC'D

- Late of the Borough of East Berlin, Adams County, Pennsylvania
- Co-Executors: Charles B. Wallace II and Suzanne I. Myers, c/o Sharon E. Myers, Esq., CGA Law Firm, PC, 135 North George Street, York, PA 17401
- Attorney: Sharon E. Myers, Esq., CGA Law Firm, PC, 135 North George Street, York, PA 17401
- ESTATE OF JOAN E. WOLF a/k/a JOAN ELIZABETH WOLF, DEC'D
 - Late of Mt. Pleasant Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania
 - Executor: Guy Bream, 225 Conewago Road, New Oxford, PA 17350
 - Attorney: Stonesifer and Kelley, P.C., 209 Broadway, Hanover, PA 17331

SECOND PUBLICATION

- ESTATE OF DONALD T. deCAMP, DEC'D
 - Late of Cumberland Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania
 - Executor: Scott T. deCamp, 1118 Amherst Ave., Modesto, CA 95350
 - Attorney: Puhl, Eastman & Thrasher, 220 Baltimore St., Gettysburg, PA 17325
- ESTATE OF BARBARA LEE SMITH GREENBERG, DEC'D
 - Late of Mt. Joy Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania
 - Executor: Lisa Siedlecki, 490 Barlow Two Taverns Road, Gettysburg, PA 17325
 - Attorney: Teeter, Teeter & Teeter, 108 W. Middle St., Gettysburg, PA 17325
- ESTATE OF MARY ELIZABETH STUDY, DEC'D
 - Late of Cumberland Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania
 - Co-Executors: Roy E. Study, Jr., 4002 Tara Dr., Colleyville, TX 76034; Anna Catherine Hostetler, 395 Bowers Rd., Littlestown, PA 17340
- ESTATE OF LYNN W. WIEGAND, DEC'D
 - Late of Hamiltonban Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania
 - Executor: ACNB Bank, P.O. Box 4566, Gettysburg, PA 17325
 - Attorney: Gary E. Hartman, Esq., Hartman & Yannetti, 126 Baltimore Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325

THIRD PUBLICATION

ESTATE OF VELMA A. FITZ, DEC'D

- Late of Oxford Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania
- Executrix: Ruth E. Godfrey, c/o Richard R. Reilly, Esq., 56 S. Duke Street, York, PA 17401-1402
- Attorney: Richard R. Reilly, Esq., 56 S. Duke Street, York, PA 17401-1402

ESTATE OF KRISTINA FRITZ, DEC'D

- Late of Oxford Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania
- Administrator: Anton Freund, 34-05 80th Street, Jackson Heights, New York 11372
- Attorney: Elinor Albright Rebert, Esq., 515 Carlisle St., Hanover, PA 17331

ESTATE OF BETTY L. KALTREIDER, DEC'D

- Late of the Borough of Abbottstown, Adams County, Pennsylvania
- Executor: Brenda L. Avey, c/o Sharon E. Myers, Esq., CGA Law Firm, PC, 135 North George Street, York, PA 17401
- Attorney: Sharon E. Myers, Esq., CGA Law Firm, PC, 135 North George Street, York, PA 17401

ESTATE OF ROBERT S. MILLER, DEC'D

- Late of the Borough of Gettysburg, Adams County, Pennsylvania
- Executors: Deborah C. Slothour, 220 Gun Club Road, Orrtanna, PA 17353; Victoria E. Deardorff, 2779 Old Route 30, Orrtanna, PA 17353
- Attorney: Wendy Weikal-Beauchat, Esq., 63 West High St., Gettysburg, PA 17325