

Adams County Legal Journal


Vol. 58

January 27, 2017

No. 38, pp. 214 - 221

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V. JEREMY SHANER



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ADAMS COUNTY LEGAL JOURNAL (USPS 542-600)

Designated for the Publication of Court and other Legal Notices. Published weekly by Adams County Bar Association, John W. Phillips, Esq., Editor and Business Manager.

Business Office – 117 BALTIMORE STREET, ROOM 305, GETTYSBURG, PA 17325-2313. Telephone: (717) 334-1553

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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF ADAMS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION – LAW
NO. 2016-SU-337

NOTICE OF SHERIFF SALE OF
REAL ESTATE PURSUANT TO
PA.R.C.P. NO. 3129

Wells Fargo Bank, NA, Plaintiff

vs.

Unknown Heirs, and/or Administrators
of the Estate of Stephen J. Groh; Daniel
Groh, as believed heir and/or adminis-
trator to the Estate of Stephen J. Groh;
Gail Groh, as believed heir and/or
administrator to the Estate of Stephen J.
Groh, Defendants

TO: Unknown Heirs, and/or
Administrators of the Estate of Stephen
J. Groh

Take Notice that by virtue of the Writ
of Execution issued out of the Court of
Common Pleas of Adams County,
Pennsylvania, and directed to the Sheriff
of Adams County, there will be exposed
to Public Sale at the Adams County
Sheriff's Office, 117 Baltimore St., Rm.
4, Gettysburg, PA 17325 on 5/19/17 at
10:00AM, prevailing local time, your real
property described herein. The Real
Property to Be Sold is delineated in
detail in a legal description consisting of
a statement of the measured boundaries
of the property, together with a brief
mention of the buildings and any other
major improvements erected on the
land. The Location of your property to be
sold is: 33 West Imperial Drive, Aspers,
PA 17304. The Judgment under or pur-
suant to which your property is being
sold is docketed to No. 2016-SU-337. A
complete copy of the Notice of Sheriff
Sale will be sent to you upon request to
the Atty. for the Plaintiff, Kimberly A.
Bonner, Manley Deas Kochalski LLC, P.
O. Box 165028, Columbus, OH 43216-
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Notice of the Time and Place of the Sale
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1/27

JAMES ZSIGA AND ELIZABETH ZSIGA V.
JEREMY SHANER

1. As a general rule, the doctrine of assumption of risk was repealed by the Pennsylvania General Assembly's adoption of a system of recovery based on comparative default in the Comparative Negligence Act. However, shortly after enacting the Comparative Negligence Act, the General Assembly amended the Skier's Responsibility Act to specifically preserve the assumption of risk doctrine in cases involving downhill skiing injuries.

2. The assumption of risk defense, as preserved by the Act, has also been described as a no-duty rule, i.e., as a principle that an owner or operator of a place of amusement has no duty to protect the user from any hazards inherent in the activity.

3. The Supreme Court made clear that the no-duty rule applies to preclude recovery where injuries result from risks that are "common, frequent, and expected" and inherent to the sport of downhill skiing. Where there is no duty, there can be no negligence, and thus when inherent risks are involved, negligence principles are irrelevant. . . and there can be no recovery based on allegations of negligence.

4. In *Hughes*, the Supreme Court laid out a two-part inquiry for determining whether a skier assumed the risk of a particular injury: (1) whether the skier was engaged in the sport of downhill skiing at the time of the injury; and (2) whether the injury arose out of a risk inherent to the sport of skiing.

5. Accordingly, disposition of the current motion turns on whether, under the facts of this case, the risk of being hit from behind by another skier while transcending a slope is an "inherent risk" of downhill skiing. Unfortunately for Zsiga, common experience and appellate precedent lead to an unavoidable conclusion that the risk of collision between skiers on a ski slope, as occurred instantly, is a risk inherent in the sport of downhill skiing.

6. Unquestionably, as an experienced skier, Zsiga can reasonably be charged with realizing the inherent risks of collision during the course of skiing down a slope.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ADAMS COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA, CIVIL 15-S-1070, JAMES ZSIGA AND
ELIZABETH ZSIGA V. JEREMY SHANER.

Jeffrey J. Dodds, Esq., Attorney for Plaintiffs Christopher M.
Reeser, Esq., Attorney for Defendant

George, J., January 13, 2017

OPINION

Presently before the Court, is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Jeremy Shaner (“Shaner”) to the Complaint of James and Elizabeth Zsiga (“Zsiga”)¹. The Complaint alleges an action in negligence arising from a skiing accident occurring at Liberty Mountain Ski Resort (“Ski Liberty”) in Carroll Valley, Adams County, Pennsylvania.

The relevant facts underlying this litigation occurred on February 25, 2014 while Zsiga was skiing at Ski Liberty. He was an experienced skier and a certified Level I ski instructor with the Professional Ski Instructors of America. He was also a volunteer at Ski Liberty providing skiing lessons to disabled skiers. At the beginning of the ski season, Zsiga signed an Acknowledgment Form acknowledging downhill skiing includes “certain risks that can lead to catastrophic injury or death.” In signing the document, he agreed “to voluntarily assume the risk of injury while participating in [downhill skiing].”² On the date in question, Zsiga had earlier taught a ski lesson and remained at the resort to ski recreationally for the remainder of the day.

Shaner was also skiing at Ski Liberty on February 25, 2014. He also was an experienced skier and was a board member of the LTRC Snow Club. He was at Ski Liberty on February 25, 2014 as a chaperone of middle school students who were on a ski trip that day.

At approximately 8 p.m., Zsiga was skiing down Lower Ultra Trail. The start of the Lower Ultra Trail commences just below an area on the mountain where three trails from the upper part of the mountain intersect. Included among the intersecting trails are the Upper Heavenly Trail and the Upper Ultra Trail. Shaner, skiing with two other board members of the snow club, traveled through this same intersectional area on the mountain at approximately the same time as Zsiga. Although the precise location is subject to dispute, there is no question a collision occurred when Shaner struck Zsiga from behind and on the right side. As a result of the collision, Zsiga

¹ Elizabeth Zsiga’s cause of action against Shaner is limited to a loss of consortium action which is dependent upon the claim of her husband, James Zsiga. Accordingly, for purposes of considering the Motion for Summary Judgment, all references to Zsiga will be references to actions of the main Plaintiff, James Zsiga.

² Exhibit A, Motion for Summary Judgment

suffered two broken ribs and Shaner sustained a concussion, loss of consciousness, and bruised ribs. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident and Shaner claims memory loss due to his injuries. Shaner did however advise ski patrol that he was “out of control” at the time of the accident but attributes that statement to the reality that he ultimately crashed. Zsiga claims to have not seen Shaner prior to being hit by him from behind. The two individuals skiing with Shaner gave partially conflicting accounts of the event.

Shaner seeks summary judgment claiming Zsiga cannot establish a duty on his part. He argues that Zsiga voluntarily assumed the risk of potential harm arising from his negligent conduct. He points to Pennsylvania’s Skier’s Responsibility Act (“Act”) which preserves the doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk as it applies to downhill skiing injuries and damages. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7102(c).

Zsiga counters he did not assume the risk of a skier who is skiing out of control at excessive speeds with no regard for others’ safety. He points out that the Act does not operate as a complete bar to recovery but rather only precludes recovery where the injury arises from an inherent risk of skiing which is common, frequent, or expected. He claims Shaner’s conduct does not fall within that category.

The standard for obtaining summary judgment is well defined under Pennsylvania jurisprudence. Summary judgment should only be entered where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp.*, 981 A.2d 198, 203 (Pa. 2009). Because of the nature of the relief, a motion for summary judgment requires the strictest scrutiny and should be granted only in the clearest of cases. *Williams v. Pilgrim Life Ins. Co.*, 452 A.2d 269, 270 (Pa. Super. 1982). However, the non-moving party may not merely rely on pleadings or answers in order to survive summary judgment as failure to identify sufficient evidence on an issue essential to the case and on which the non-moving party bears the burden of proof entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. *Murphy v. Duquesne University of the Holy Ghost*, 777 A.2d 418, 429 (Pa. 2001). In weighing the evidence, the record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. **Id.**

As a general rule, the doctrine of assumption of risk was repealed by the Pennsylvania General Assembly's adoption of a system of recovery based on comparative fault in the Comparative Negligence Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7102(a)-(b). However, shortly after enacting the Comparative Negligence Act, the General Assembly amended the Skier's Responsibility Act to specifically preserve the assumption of risk doctrine in cases involving downhill-skiing injuries. The assumption of risk defense, as preserved by the Act, "has also been described as a 'no-duty' rule, i.e., as a principle that an owner or operator of a place of amusement has no duty to protect the user from any hazards inherent in the activity." *Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P.*, 2 A.3d 1174, 1186 (Pa. 2010)³. In *Hughes v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc.*, 762 A.2d 339 (Pa. 2000), the Supreme Court made clear that the "no-duty" rule applies to preclude recovery where injuries result from risks that are "common, frequent, and expected" and inherent to the sport of downhill skiing. "Where there is no duty, there can be no negligence, and thus when inherent risks are involved, negligence principles are irrelevant...and there can be no recovery based on allegations of negligence." *Chepkevich*, 2 A.3d at 1186.

In *Hughes*, the Supreme Court laid out a two-part inquiry for determining whether a skier assumed the risk of a particular injury: (1) whether the skier was engaged in the sport of downhill skiing at the time of the injury; and (2) whether the injury arose out of a risk inherent to the sport of skiing. *Hughes*, 762 A.2d at 344. As it cannot be seriously disputed that both Zsiga and Shaner were engaged in the sport of downhill skiing at the time of the accident and subsequent injury, the sole remaining inquiry is whether Zsiga's injuries arose out of a risk inherent in the sport of skiing. Accordingly, disposition of the current motion turns on whether, under the facts of this case, the risk of being hit from behind by another skier while transcending a slope is an "inherent risk" of downhill skiing. Unfortunately for Zsiga, common experience and appellate precedent lead to an unavoidable conclusion that the risk of collision between skiers on a ski slope, as occurred instantly, is a risk inherent in the sport of

³ In *Bell v. Dean, III*, 5 A.3d 266 (Pa. Super. 2010), the Superior Court determined that the Act preserves the doctrine of assumption of risk as a potential bar to negligence in actions between two or more patrons of a ski resort as well as between patrons and the ski resort.

downhill skiing.

In *Hughes*, the Supreme Court concluded that the Act protected a ski resort from a negligence claim resulting from injuries suffered when the plaintiff was struck by an unknown skier while she was skiing toward the lift area through an area at the base of the mountain. In support of its opinion, the Court offered the following insight:

It is equally clear that the risks of colliding with another skier at the base of a ski slope is one of the “common, frequent, and expected” risks “inherent” in downhill skiing. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7102(c)(1). Indeed, other skiers are as much a part of the risk in downhill skiing, if not more so, than the snow and ice, elevation, contour, speed, and weather conditions. As anyone who has ever undertaken the sport of skiing is painfully aware, it is a sport in which it is common for the participants to lose control. The instant collision occurred in an area of the mountain where several trails converge. Skiers, including appellee, were skiing through this area, while others, including the skier who collided with her, entered the area at the end of their own downhill runs: in appellee’s words, she was struck “by someone who was coming down the hill, coming down the slope”... The fact that appellee was at the base of the downhill trail she had just negotiated did little to lessen the ever-present danger that another downhill skier, coming down the mountain on the very same trail just behind her, was going faster than she was, or intended to ski further than she just had, and could then lose control and collide with her.

Hughes, A.2d at 344-345.

In *Bell v. Dean*, 5 A.3d 266 (Pa. Super. 2010), a panel of the Superior Court had the opportunity to apply the instruction of *Hughes*. The issue in *Bell* was whether a skier was able to recover from injuries resulting from a collision with a snowboarder. The plaintiff claimed the boarder was traveling at a high rate of speed and was out of control while snowboarding beyond his abilities. The plaintiff argued that the risk of another skier’s or snowboarder’s skiing out of control at a high speed is not a risk inherent to the sport of downhill skiing and therefore falls beyond purview of the Act. In

rejecting plaintiff's argument, the panel observed:

In this sport, skiers and snowboarders are carried to the top of a mountain to ski and snowboard down "runs" of varying difficulty, just to do it all over again. Most, if not all, skiing or snowboarding takes place amongst other skiers and snowboarders. Rarely, is it the case that a skier finds him or herself traversing the slopes alone, unaccompanied by others. Each participant on the slope is of varying age, coordination, and skill. Some are beginners, some are more experienced, but few are experts or professionals. Moreover, participants travel down the mountain at different speeds. Some travel down the slope in a straight line with greater speed than those who slalom down the mountain in a wide S-type pattern. That this varied group of skiers and snowboarders alike, for recreation, proceed voluntarily down the side of a mountain together, simultaneously, creates the obvious danger for mishaps leading to collisions among them. The causes of such mishaps would certainly include incidents similar to [the] allegations, of ordinary carelessness or inadvertence. Indeed, general allegations of this sort could serve as the basis upon which many skiing or snowboarding collisions occur.

Id. at 272.

Furthermore, it is clear that Zsiga was aware of the inherent risks of colliding with another skier. In his deposition testimony, Zsiga acknowledged executing the acknowledgement form which reflected his understanding that skiing bears certain risks that can lead to injury or death. He had skied at Ski Liberty for approximately nine years and described himself as a Level I certified ski instructor as certified by the Professional Ski Instructors of America. His deposition testimony also confirms his awareness that some of the risks inherent in skiing include running into a tree or getting hit by somebody (Deposition Transcript of James Zsiga, June 27, 2016, pg. 27). As part of his experience as a skier, he has seen others treated for injuries including injuries suffered from collisions between skiers (Tr., pg. 28). Unquestionably, as an experienced skier, Zsiga can reasonably be charged with realizing the inherent risks of collision

during the course of skiing down a slope.

Zsiga attempts to distinguish *Hughes* and its progeny by arguing Shaner's conduct exceeded what one might normally expect to assume while participating in the sport of skiing. In support of his argument, he relies on the Superior Court Opinion in *Crews v. Seven Springs Mountain Resort*, 874 A.2d 100 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 890 A.2d 1059 (Pa. 2005). This suggestion however misapplies the decision in *Crews*. *Crews* involved a suit against a resort for a collision involving an intoxicated minor who had allegedly been drinking on defendant's property and of which the defendant had notice. Under these facts, the Superior Court panel held that the risk of injuries arising out of a collision with an underage drinker on a snowboard was not inherent to the sport of skiing as that particular risk could be removed "without altering the nature of the sport." *Id.* at 104. However, the *Crews* factual background is quite distinct from that currently before the Court. Indeed, the *Crews* Court itself distinguished the current factual background by twice indicating their decision would have been different had the claim arisen from a collision between skiers. See *Crews*, 874 A.2d at 102, 104. Just as importantly, in *Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P.*, *supra*, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court criticized *Crews* for narrowly defining an "inherent risk" as "one that cannot be removed without altering the fundamental nature of skiing." *Chepkevich*, 2 A.3d at 1187 n. 14. In doing so, the *Chepkevich* Court took issue with the "narrow, hypertechnical manner" applied to their prior instruction in *Hughes*. Therefore, *Crews* is neither controlling nor persuasive.

There simply is no factual support for the claim that Shaner's actions exceeded those one might normally expect while skiing. Although Zsiga surmises that Shaner was "skiing at an excessive rate of speed," there is nothing in the record other than circumstantial inferences which lack support in factual allegations. For instance, Zsiga claims Shaner was skiing at an excessively fast rate because at the time of collision, he was making one more "run" which was commenced approximately 45 minutes prior to the time he was scheduled to depart by bus. Zsiga argues this evidence suggests Shaner "certainly [was] not shushing down the mountain at slow speeds when [he] had to get the lift back to the top and ski back down the back of the mountain, return [his] skis and boots to the rental center and get

the kids on the bus by 8:00 p.m.” I do not agree.

As recognized by the appellate authority above, the sport of skiing involves the interaction of many different skiers of different skill levels traversing a mountain downhill at various rates of speed. Undoubtedly, it is reasonable to conclude that Shaner, a well experienced expert skier, was traveling down the mountain at a higher rate of speed than those of novice or intermediate level talent. However, the suggestion that his speed was excessively out of character for his talent level is nothing more than unsupported speculation. Indeed, even assuming Shaner was traveling in a straight line at a high rate of speed, this conclusion does not change the outcome as it is inherent in the sport. Zsiga’s current argument is essentially the same argument rejected by the Supreme Court in *Chepkevich* and the Superior Court in *Bell*. Therefore, Shaner’s Motion for Summary Judgment is properly granted as Zsiga assumed the risk of collision on a ski slope, and Shaner owed no duty to protect him from the risk.

For the foregoing reasons, the attached Order is entered.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 13th day of January, 2017, summary judgment is granted in favor of the Defendant, Jeremy Shaner, and against the Plaintiffs, James and Elizabeth Zsiga, on all counts.

ESTATE NOTICES

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that in the estates of the decedents set forth below, the Register of Wills has granted letters, testamentary of or administration to the persons named. All persons having claims or demands against said estates are requested to make known the same, and all persons indebted to said estates are requested to make payment without delay to the executors or administrators or their attorneys named below.

FIRST PUBLICATION**ESTATE OF REBEKAH FARACE, DEC'D**

Late of Union Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Administrator: James Farace, c/o Sandra Yerger, P.O. Box 214, Littlestown, PA 17340

Attorney: Sandra Yerger, P.O. Box 214, Littlestown, PA 17340

ESTATE OF LONNIE K. GROVES, DEC'D

Late of Freedom Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Teresa L. Mitchell, 14 Blake Ct., Reisterstown, MD 21136

ESTATE OF CATHERINE C. HARMON, DEC'D

Late of Menallen Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Administrator: Gem R. Moore, 30 Boyds Schoolhouse Road, Biglerville, PA 17307

Attorney: Robert E. Campbell Esq., Campbell & White, P.C., 112 Baltimore Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325

ESTATE OF LEROY S. HARNER, DEC'D

Late of Mt. Pleasant Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Keith L. Harner, 700 Hawthorne Street, York, PA 17404; Sandra K. Staub, 71 Littlestown Road, Littlestown, PA 17340

Attorney: Thomas E. Miller, Esq., Law Office of Thomas E. Miller, Esq., LLC, 249 York Street, Hanover, PA 17331

ESTATE OF JOHN C. KUNKEL a/k/a JOHN C. KUNKEL, Sr., DEC'D

Late of Franklin Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Co-Executors: James A. Kunkel, 31 Tiffany Lane, Gettysburg, PA 17325; Judy Kunkel Ketterman, 240 York Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325

Attorney: Teeter, Teeter & Teeter, 108 West Middle Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325

ESTATE OF JAMES R. LEE a/k/a DICK LEE, DEC'D

Late of Oxford Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executrix: Mrs. Joanne E. Lee, 630 Harmony Drive, Apt. 158, New Oxford, PA 17350

Attorney: Todd A. King, Esq., Campbell & White, P.C., 112 Baltimore Street, Suite 1, Gettysburg, PA 17325-2311

ESTATE OF TILLIE W. WAGAMAN, DEC'D

Late of Menallen Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Co-Executors: Gary R. Wagaman, 330 Arendtsville Road, Biglerville, PA 17307; Kenneth E. Wagaman, P.O. Box 131, Bendersville, PA 17306; Randy F. Wagaman, 298 Opossum Hill Road, Aspers, PA 17304; Roger L. Wagaman, 1310 Gun Club Road, York Springs, PA 17372

Attorney: Robert E. Campbell, Esq., Campbell & White, P.C., 112 Baltimore Street, Suite 1, Gettysburg, PA 17325-2311

SECOND PUBLICATION**ESTATE OF HENRY PAUL FISSEL, a/k/a HENRY P. FISSEL, DEC'D**

Late of Franklin Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executor: Jeffrey C. Fissel, c/o Barbara Jo Entwistle, Esq., Entwistle & Roberts, 37 West Middle Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325

Attorney: Barbara Jo Entwistle, Esq., Entwistle & Roberts, 37 West Middle Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325

ESTATE OF KENNETH LEE JAMES, DEC'D

Late of the Borough of Gettysburg, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Administratrix: Sandra L. Triplett, c/o Samuel A. Gates, Esq., Gates & Gates, P.C., 250 York Street, Hanover, PA 17331

Attorney: Samuel A. Gates, Esq., Gates & Gates, P.C., 250 York Street, Hanover, PA 17331

ESTATE OF EDGAR J. MILLER, DEC'D

Late of the Borough of Bonneauville, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executrix: Karen A. Gettel, c/o Amy S. Loper, Esq., 11 Carlisle Street, Suite 301, Hanover, PA 17331

Attorney: Amy S. Loper, Esq., 11 Carlisle Street, Suite 301, Hanover, PA 17331

ESTATE OF DORIS B. MORGAN, DEC'D

Late of Oxford Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Personal Representative: Carroll M. Davenport, 675 Iron Ridge Rd., Hanover, PA 17331

Attorney: G. Steven McKonly, Esq., 119 Baltimore Street, Hanover, PA 17331

ESTATE OF REVA MAE RARIG, DEC'D

Late of Franklin Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executrices: Elizabeth Tyson, P.O. Box 127, Gardners, PA 17324; Susan Makler, 918 Clinton Road, Los Altos, CA 94024

Attorney: Kenneth E. Ahl, Esq., Archer & Greiner, P.C., 1650 Market St., 32nd Fl., Philadelphia, PA 19103

ESTATE OF ETHEL C. RILEY, DEC'D

Late of Oxford Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executors: Luxie Ann Althoff, 671 March Creek Road, Gettysburg, PA 17325; Linda K. Luckenbaugh, 691 March Creek Road, Gettysburg, PA 17325

Attorney: Adam C. Zei, Esq., Campbell & White, P.C., 112 Baltimore Street, Suite 1, Gettysburg, PA 17325-2311

ESTATE OF DONALD P. SELL, a/k/a DONALD SELL, DEC'D

Late of Germany Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Donald P. Sell, II, 7103 Aldrich Court, Spotsylvania, VA 22553

Attorney: Thomas E. Miller, Esq., Law Office of Thomas E. Miller, Esq., LLC, 249 York Street, Hanover, PA 17331

ESTATE OF CATHERINE M. WITHERS, DEC'D

Late of the Borough of McSherrystown, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executrix: Jane C. Bedford, 419 North Street, McSherrystown, PA 17344

Attorney: John J. Mooney, III, Esq., Mooney & Associates, 230 York Street, Hanover, PA 17331

THIRD PUBLICATION

ESTATE OF MAYNARD S. BARNHART
JR., DEC'D

Late of Conewago Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Executrix: Erma L. Barnhart, 10 Pine
Court, Abbottstown, PA 17301

Attorney: Keith R. Nonemaker, Esq.,
Guthrie, Nonemaker, Yingst & Hart,
LLP, 40 York Street, Hanover, PA
17331

ESTATE OF CONNIE A FRITZ, DEC'D

Late of Cumberland Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Administrators CTA: Nicole B. Harris,
13085 Iroquois Trail, Waynesboro,
PA 17268; Wendy L. Clapsaddle,
685 Fairview Fruit Road, Gettysburg,
PA 17325

Attorney: Robert E. Campbell, Esq.,
Campbell & White, P.C., 112
Baltimore Street, Gettysburg, PA
17325

ESTATE OF SEBASTIAN R. HAFER a/k/a
SEBASTIAN ROBERT HAFER, DEC'D

Late of Straban Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Executor: ACNB Bank, P.O. Box 4566,
Gettysburg, PA 17325

Attorney: Puhl, Eastman & Thrasher,
220 Baltimore Street, Gettysburg,
PA 17325

ESTATE OF MARION A. MURREN a/k/a
MARION ANN MURREN, DEC'D

Late of Union Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Executor: Anthony J. Murren, c/o
Kevin G. Robinson, Esq., Gates &
Gates, P.C., 60 E. Middle Street,
Gettysburg, PA 17325

Attorney: Kevin G. Robinson, Esq.,
Gates & Gates, P.C., 60 E. Middle
Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325