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
BARBARA JO ENTWISTLE VS. JULIA C. RETOWSKY
AND KELLY S. RETOWSKY

(Part 3 of 4)

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FICTITIOUS NAME NOTICE

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on or about March 29, 2021, an application for Registration of Fictitious Name was filed with the Department of State of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania pursuant to the Fictitious Name Act, for the purpose of registering a Pennsylvania fictitious name. The fictitious name is IKE'S BUNKER and its registered office is located at 47 Steinwehr Avenue, Gettysburg, PA 17325. The fictitious name is registered to Regimental Quartermaster, Inc. of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

Todd A. King, Esq.
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4/9



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BARBARA JO ENTWISTLE VS. JULIA C. RETOWSKY
AND KELLY S. RETOWSKY

(Part 3 of 4)

D. Testimony of Jake Bylsma.

At the time of the hearing Kelly proposed to have Mr. Bylsma testify that he publishes videos on-line that have undermined the Adams County judiciary and which include references to the divorce action between Julia and Kelly. Mr. Bylsma would purportedly testify that the videos are viewed by thousands of persons whose responses indicate that my continued involvement would be viewed by the public as undermining the integrity of the local court. That request was denied.²⁵

Assertions of the appearance of impropriety must be measured against the actual allegations of misconduct made against the jurist in question. During the hearing Kelly only pursued the issue of the ex-parte communication, an alleged social relationship between Barbara and the Court, and the fact that Barbara is a local attorney. The question then becomes whether the evidence presented on those concerns would cause a significant minority of the lay community to reasonably question my continued involvement in this case.

The Superior Court, in *Commonwealth v. Dip, supra.*, had a recent opportunity to speak to what constitutes a significant minority of the lay community and how what that community considers to be reasonable is determined. There, when faced with a question whether to grant a recusal motion, the trial court concluded that his alleged conduct did not result in an appearance of impropriety. Pertinent to the instant issue, the appellate court stated:

When assessing the trial court's application of the Significant Minority standard, **we cannot poll the lay community, nor is it clear, even if we could conduct such a poll, how we would quantify what percentage of the lay public constitutes a significant minority thereof.** By invoking the lay community rather than the public at large, we assume that the standard dictates that the lower court exclude professional legal opinions on

²⁵ This proffer was completely different than the original averment in the Petition regarding a video posted by Mr. Bylsma that was discussed in the hearing for injunctive relief in the defamation action. That particular allegation will be discussed later.

the matter, opinions which might theoretically place more faith in the impartiality of the judiciary than the average layperson. Thus, granting that assumption, the Significant Minority standard set the bar for establishing an appearance of impropriety quite low.

Regardless of the uncertainties involved in applying the Significant Minority standard, this Court's standard of review of that decision – whether the trial court abused its discretion in applying the Significant Minority standard – is highly deferential to the trial court's reasoning. As is now axiomatic:

The term 'discretion' imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused when the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will ...

Supra., 221 A.3d at 210. (citations omitted)(emphasis added).

The Superior Court clearly questioned the approach suggested by Kelly in this matter. Unstated, but certainly a concern, is how to frame a poll to accurately reflect the background supporting the basis for recusal, how to measure whether the responses reflect a significant minority of the lay community, and finally how to determine whether those responses are reasonable. Instead, that court acknowledges that the decision whether the alleged conduct creates an appearance of impropriety lies with the judge whose decision becomes final unless overturned on appeal because of an abuse of discretion.

The testimony proffered by Kelly exemplifies the problematic nature of his approach. The mere fact that Mr. Bylsma may have created some videos about alleged local court corruption does not speak to whether the undersigned has any bias or partiality toward the parties in this litigation. Separate allegations of corruption made by Mr.

Bylsma are not pertinent to this case. In other words, what others may think about selective accusations regarding the court system does not address the specific reasons advanced by Kelly in this case and, therefore, responses to those videos would not necessarily serve as a basis for concluding that a significant minority of the lay community could reasonably question the Court's impartiality. Consequently, even if permitted, any responses to his videos would be meaningless on that issue unless put in proper context. Instead, it would require being able to relate responses to portions of the videos that are consistent with Kelly's allegations presented at the instant hearing and then viewing those videos for inaccuracies, bias, or selective editing as to Kelly's allegations. Such an exercise goes far beyond what is appropriate.

Furthermore, the introduction of such videos could be seen as a blatant attempt to inflame the passion of the Court against Kelly in order to ensure recusal. Allowing this testimony would open the door to an exploration whether Kelly is responsible for providing Mr. Bylsma with some of the material being used in his publications. Avoiding exposure to that possible connection diminishes the argument that the Court has bias or prejudice toward Kelly than could otherwise be raised.²⁶

For these reasons, the testimony of Mr. Bylsma was precluded.

E. Referral To Judicial Conduct Board.

During the hearing Kelly testified that in 2018 he was advised by Mr. Clark that I made the call to which he referred. When asked how he felt about the call Kelly responded that "the judge is a scumbag" and could not thereafter be impartial. After receipt of that information, Kelly reportedly filed a written complaint with the Judicial Conduct Board about the call. He could not recall if he was interviewed about the complaint and did not indicate whether he received notice of any disposition. This is the first time I was aware of any such complaint being made by Kelly.

²⁶ There is another troubling aspect of this background that cannot be encouraged or countenanced. A dangerous precedent would be set if a party who, when dissatisfied with a judge, can simply make or encourage public allegations of corruption or bias; whether valid, baseless, selective, discriminate, suggestive or inaccurate; and use those publications, and responses thereto, to achieve recusal. Such action promotes the condemned practice of judge shopping.

Complaints received by the Judicial Conduct Board are referred to Chief Counsel for further review to determine whether grounds exist to believe the allegations in the information received. J. C. B. Rule of Procedure 25 and 26. Chief Counsel reports the results of any preliminary inquiry and recommends that the Board either 1) dismiss the complaint; 2) proceed with a full investigation; or 3) defer action during the pendency of a criminal matter, if appropriate. J. C. B. Rule of Procedure 27. All information and proceedings relating to a complaint are confidential and disclosure is limited to certain criteria not applicable here. J. C. B. Rule of Procedure 17 and 18. If the complaint was dismissed or referred for further action Kelly would have been notified. If a complaint is dismissed after preliminary review, the subject judge is so notified but neither the nature of the complaint nor the complaining party is identified.

The present concern is not that Kelly made a complaint but rather that he revealed that he had done so at this hearing. Therefore, I must now address whether such information serves as a basis for recusal in this partition action. Judges are acutely aware that litigants will make referrals to the Judicial Conduct Board for any number of reasons. For the most part our judicial experience and demeanor allows us to deflect those attacks and to proceed in the case without any bias or partiality.

There may, of course, be incidents where the allegation is so egregious that the judge is rightfully impacted to the point that recusal is the best course. That situation does not exist here. As discussed above, Kelly apparently complained about an alleged ex-parte communication that occurred over two years ago in another case. The fact that a complaint of this nature was made does not create any prejudice against Kelly on my part because, as noted earlier, no ethics violation is apparent. Allowing this background to serve as precedence for recusal would be dangerous for obvious reasons. One must approach with caution any situation where a person files an ethics complaint and then intentionally discloses that fact to that judge in the course of litigation. Such action could be viewed as a strategic effort to enhance recusal. Allowing that strategy to succeed could well encourage judge shopping.

F. Timeliness of the Petition For Recusal

As mentioned, a party who knows of facts that would disqualify a judge but does not timely move for recusal will be considered to have waived the issue. *In Re Lokuta, supra.*, 11 A.3d at 437; *Lomas v. Kravitz, supra.*, 130 A.3d at 121. Paramount among the concerns when a party significantly delays making the request for recusal is the attempt to judge shop. *Id.* If a party waits until after the trial judge has been significantly involved in a case and has made substantive decisions, he will not be permitted to raise a request for recusal based upon information known before those decisions have been made.

Because of his long-standing family relationships Kelly has obviously been aware that Barbara had been practicing law locally for many years. The fact that the undersigned was a judge in Adams County for three decades was also well-known. Nevertheless, after my appointment in the divorce proceeding in March 2017 Kelly did not request recusal even though his opponent was Barbara's daughter and despite the fact that Barbara testified in an early stage of those proceedings. In fact, the Court addressed numerous matters in the divorce case without a request for recusal.²⁷ Kelly has also been aware of my purported telephone call with Mr. Clark since at least the end of 2018. He has also been aware of my alleged parking at the re-enactment for the past 7 – 17 years. Any attempt to request recusal in the divorce matter has been clearly waived.

This partition matter was filed in November 2018 and the undersigned was assigned to the case shortly thereafter. Over the ensuing 24 months the Court presided over numerous matters in this case.²⁸ Not until Kelly attempted to secure recusal through President Judge George in late December 2020 was the issue even raised. A verbal

²⁷ Petition For Special Relief filed April 12, 2017; Motion to Compel filed July 7, 2017; Petition For Special Relief filed August 6, 2018; APL; divorce decree; exceptions to master's report; Appellate Rule 1925 Opinion; Motion to Stay filed September 29, 2020; Petition For Special Relief and Contempt filed September 30, 2020.

²⁸ Motion to Consolidate filed November 14, 2018; Status Conference; Motion For Order Directing Sale of Property filed March 21, 2019; Motion For Order Directing Confirmation of Farm Lease filed April 9, 2019; Petition For Special Relief filed June 6, 2019; Kelly's request that Barbara Jo be prohibited from acting pro se; Petition For Special Relief filed September 27, 2019; Petition For Special Relief filed December 19, 2019; Motion For Order Regarding Listing Agreement filed August 18, 2020.

request for recusal in this particular case was expressly made by Kelly on January 8, 2021, nearly 46 months after I was first assigned to cases involving these parties. A formal motion followed 21 days later.

Despite Kelly's extended delay in pursuing recusal, the Court will not deny his request in this partition action solely on the basis of waiver. Cases finding waiver usually arise where a court has made substantive decisions on the merits of the litigation. *Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, supra.*; *Lomas v. Kravitz, supra.* Up to this point in the instant litigation, the Court has mostly dealt with procedural matters while the parties have attempted to market the real estate. The most significant issue yet to be resolved is for the Court to precisely define the parties' interests in the net proceeds of sale. That decision will primarily be dependent upon interpretation of the parties' written agreements. Even though Kelly's current request will not be dismissed on the basis of waiver, the significant delay seems relevant to the question of whether actual partiality is a motivating factor for seeking the Court's recusal.

II. Matters Raised in the Petition But Not Addressed At the Hearing.

A. The Divorce and Support Actions

Kelly contends in his Petition that there were a series of events in the divorce and support matters that raise concerns about the undersigned's ability to be impartial in the current partition action.

1. Judge Simpson's Recusal.

First, Kelly references Judge Simpson's recusal at hearing on March 20, 2017. The Court cannot presume the reason(s) for that recusal but it was likely, based upon the fact that Julia's mother would regularly appear before Judge Simpson in family law cases, that jurist wanted to avoid the appearance of impartiality that might exist if she stayed in the case. Whether the other judges of the 51st Judicial District²⁹ specifically recused themselves prior to my assignment is unknown to me.

Occasionally, but rarely it is necessary for all judges of a court to engage in a self-analysis and agree to recuse themselves from a case. *Hvizdak v. Linn, supra.*, 190 A.2d at 1223. Here, I did not have the same potential concern Judge Simpson (or the other judges of the

²⁹ The Adams County bench at that time, and currently, consists of President Judge George, Hon. Thomas Campbell, Hon. Shawn Wagner and Hon. Christina Simpson.

court if they weighed in on the matter) may have faced because I had been retired for over two years by March 2017 and had no contact with Barbara during the interim. I am not privy to any other relationships that might exist between Barbara and the other local sitting judges. However, because of my lack of any social or business relationship with Barbara, as well as my limited professional relationship with her, recusal was not a personal concern.

2. April 12, 2017 Order and April 19, 2017 Deed.

Second, Kelly references a hearing held April 12, 2017³⁰ and contends that the Court's alleged failure to address violation of an order arising out of that proceeding evidences bias. At that time Julia had filed a Petition For Special Relief. She was intending to purchase a property where she would reside separate from Kelly.³¹ She hoped to partially finance the purchase price through a loan from the Adams County National Bank. The bank was seeking some assurance that this real estate would not be considered a marital asset in the divorce proceeding. The bank wanted Julia to secure a waiver from Kelly as to any spousal claim he might have to that property before granting the loan, but he declined. Barbara testified that she and her husband would be providing half of the purchase price. Julia offered testimony supporting her claim that the balance of the necessary funds would come from assets and earnings she accumulated after the filing of the divorce action.

Based upon the limited record, the Court entered an order stating, in part, that:

it does not appear from the record as it exists at this time that the purchase of this subject property would be considered a marital asset and subject to equitable distribution. However, based upon the preliminary state of this record, [Kelly] is not precluded from otherwise asserting that funds used to secure the property originated from marital assets.

That language was used because the Court realized a full exploration of the sources of funds being used to purchase the property had not occurred and, as a result of further discovery in the divorce proceeding, other information might ultimately be revealed.

³⁰ In his Petition For Recusal, Kelly erroneously referred to the hearing as being held on April 13, 2017.

³¹ Julia and Kelly stipulated that they were separated as of January 17, 2017.

Apparently, the lender was nevertheless satisfied and Julia was able to secure the loan and purchase the property on April 13, 2017. On April 19, 2017, Julia executed a deed for the same real estate to herself, as one-half owner, and to her parents, as one-half owners.³² The deed appeared to have been prepared by Barbara's law firm and contained the following language:

Pursuant to Order of Court dated April 13, 2017, docketed to Case No. 2017-S-43, Julia Retowsky vs. Kelly Retowsky, the Adams County Court of Common Pleas Ordered that Kelly Retowsky, Husband of the Grantor, does not have any marital interest in said real estate and is therefore not required to join in this transfer.

As stated, Kelly believes the Court should have addressed what he perceives as a violation of the April 12 order when Julia included the aforesaid language in the April 19 deed. However, that concern was only presented to the Court in the context of Kelly's exceptions to the recommendations of the divorce master. During the divorce master's hearing Julia again testified that one-half of the purchase price came from her mother and the other half came from the mortgage loan she secured from the bank. She also testified that all other funds needed to complete the purchase came from income she earned after separation. Kelly was not able to contradict this testimony. The master found Julia to be credible and concluded that Kelly failed to establish that Julia used any marital funds to purchase that property. Consequently, he concluded that no portion of the real estate Julia purchased was marital property and subject to equitable distribution.

In his exceptions Kelly claimed that Julia had engaged in a "scheme" to deprive him of any interest in that property. The Court had to decide whether the master erred in concluding 1) that Kelly had no marital interest in the property Julia purchased and 2) that no attorney fees should be imposed because of Julia's inclusion of the subject language in the April 19 deed.

Only marital property is subject to equitable distribution. The Divorce Code defines what constitutes marital property as including all property acquired by either spouse during the course of the marriage. 23 Pa. C.S.A. §3501(a). Marital property does not include

³² When the order was entered on April 12, 2017 the Court had no knowledge that Julia would subsequently convey an interest to her parents.

property acquired after the parties' final separation, except for property acquired in exchange for marital assets. 23 Pa. C.S.A. §3104(a) (4). Kelly offered no evidence at the master's hearing that Julia used marital assets to purchase the property. Therefore, based upon the record, I rejected the exception challenging the master's finding that no marital value was to be given to the property purchased by Julia.

Kelly now suggests that the Court has demonstrated some apparent bias because I did not address his perceived violation of the Order entered April 12, 2017. This concern speaks to Kelly's request for attorney fees and is misplaced. The order clearly stated that Kelly was not precluded from later proving that he had a marital interest in the property being purchased by Julia. The deed did not preclude that exploration and, in fact, Kelly was given that opportunity at the master's hearing. Additionally, the order did not state that any particular language was to be included in a subsequent deed when Julia purchased the property, or if she subsequently transferred an interest therein to another party. In fact, the language inserted into the April 19 deed was completely irrelevant to the exceptions that were presented to the Court for disposition.

Regardless of the language inserted in the deed, Kelly was given the opportunity at the master's hearing to prove his claim of a marital interest in the property but offered nothing in that respect. Nevertheless, the master did consider Julia's actions regarding the deed when addressing Kelly's claim for counsel fees. Although the master believed that Julia improperly included the waiver language in the deed, he did not find her actions so egregious as to warrant an award of attorney fees, especially in light of the evidence that she only used post-separation assets to purchase that property.

Counsel fees in a divorce action are not automatically awarded. Instead, the requesting party must prove the award is justified and include documentation supporting the request. Here, Kelly did not show how anything Julia did regarding the language placed in the deed, whether proper or improper, compelled him to exert any more effort than would have been required had the language in the April 17 deed not been included. He also offered no documentation supporting the attorney fees he incurred because of this language. Therefore, he did not establish a basis for an award of fees.

(continued to next issue 4/16/21)

ADAMS COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
NEW CONDITIONS OF SALES
FOR REAL ESTATE

All properties are sold "AS IS", with NO expressed or implied warranties OR guarantees whatsoever. The Sheriff and Bid4Assets shall not be liable for any loss or damage to the premises sold resulting from any cause whatsoever. In anticipation of participating in this auction and purchasing a property the bidder assumes all responsibility for "due diligence."

Prospective bidder must complete the Bid4Assets online registration process to participate in the auction. All bidders must submit a \$1,000.00 deposit (plus a \$35.00 processing fee) to Bid4Assets before the start of the auction. This single deposit will be associated with a particular auction date and allows a bidder to bid on all of the auctions that close on that particular date.

The starting bid or minimum bid for the auction will be set at "Sheriff's Costs." This is the costs that the Sheriff's Office has incurred up to the date of the sale. The plaintiff's attorney shall submit the plaintiff's upset price ("Upset Price") to Bid4Assets, at least one (1) hour prior to the start of the Auction. The Upset Price is the least amount the plaintiff will accept for a property. The Sheriff's costs will be added to the Upset Price to determine the reserve price for the auction. The reserve price is the minimum dollar amount the Sheriff will accept for the sale to go to a third-party bidder. Bidders will not know what the reserve price is, but they will see when the reserve price has been met.

If the reserve price is met, the highest bidder shall be the purchaser. By close of the next business day of the auction, the purchaser is responsible for 20% of the purchase price for each property purchased plus a buyer's premium of 1.5% of the total purchase price of each property purchased. The purchaser shall pay the balance of 80% of the purchase price for each property purchased by 5:00PM EST on the twentieth (20th) calendar day following the Auction Date unless that day falls on a holiday or weekend day, then the balance is due on the next business day by 5:00PM EST.

Failure to pay the balance by the due date will result in a default and the forfeiture of the deposit. In the event of a default the next highest bidder may be notified by Bid4Assets. The Sheriff may at their discretion settle with the second bidder who has complied with all the conditions of sale. The defaulting party shall be liable to the plaintiff and/or the Sheriff for any and all costs incurred for the resale of the property.

Winning bidder shall comply with all post-sale instructions required by the Sheriff's Office and Bid4Assets. Buyer

shall be responsible for the cost of preparing the deed and such other costs that are imposed by law. Payment extensions are uncommon. If one is necessary, the decision will be made by the plaintiff's attorney once the Sheriff's Office is notified and provides consent.

In the event an overpayment is received of the balance, the Adams County Sheriff's Office will refund the money upon payment received from Bid4Assets.

The Plaintiff, at the discretion of the Sheriff's Office, can at any time cancel the sale after the auction closes for reasons of bankruptcy and any other reason that may arise.

It is the responsibility of the bidder to investigate any and all liens, encumbrances and/or additional mortgages that may be held against the property and may not be satisfied by the post-sale Schedule "A" Distribution. The bidder assumes all responsibility for "due diligence" in anticipation of participating in this auction and purchasing a property.

The Schedule "A" Distribution will be completed, within approximately 30 days after the sale by the Sheriff's Office, for all properties sold to third party bidders.

The Schedule "A" Distribution directs how the purchase price of the property will be disbursed and which liens will be satisfied. Disbursement payments are listed in priority order. Our office follows the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure when determining these payments.

Once we complete our lien search and review the distribution, we will email a copy to the third-party bidder and all parties involved.

The Schedule "A" Distribution is available to the public for review for 10 days at the Sheriff's Office and is made part of the case history at the Prothonotary's Office.

Distribution payments will be made in accordance with the proposed Schedule "A" unless exceptions are filed on or before the tenth day of the distribution date. Pending litigation will delay processing the distribution and deed.

The Sheriff's Deed is the last step in the distribution process.

Deed processing will begin approximately 11 days after the distribution date, provided no legal actions are pending against the purchase.

Winning bidder must comply with all post-sale instructions required by Bid4Assets and the Sheriff's Office. The Sheriff's Office must receive your vesting instructions and two completed and signed, Pennsylvania Realty Transfer Tax Statement of Value Forms, with original signatures on both, to process the Sheriff's Deed. Once recorded the deed cannot be emailed to you. Two self-addressed stamped envelopes are required to mail you your recorded deed.

Important points to remember:

- The Sheriff's Office highly recommends that you seek the advice of an attorney to review the pros and cons of a Sheriff's Sale purchase.
 - The Sheriff's Office does not guarantee clear title to any property being sold.
 - The winning bidder may be responsible for additional liens; your due diligence is required.
 - The winning bidder may be responsible for completing an eviction or ejectment process. Seek legal advice for all matter related to the eviction/ejectment process.
 - The Sheriff's Office and Bid4Assets do not have keys to any of the properties.
 - Prospective bidders cannot inspect the interior of any property listed for sale.
 - Each purchase is unique; situations and issues will vary from case to case.
 - The Sheriff's Office complies with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
 - Properties are advertised in the local newspaper and the Adams County Legal Journal
 - Handbills are posted on each property and also posted at the Adams County Sheriff's Office.
 - The full listing of properties is available on the Sheriff's website under Real Estate Sheriff's Sales www.adamscounty.us/Dept/Sheriff/Pages/SalesDates.aspx.
 - Sales are typically scheduled for the third Friday of every other month, starting in January. A calendar of dates and filing deadlines is published on the Sheriff's Office website.
 - The sales are open to the public via an online format at Bid4Assets: Adams County Sheriff Real Property Foreclosure Auctions – registration is required.
 - Deeding instruction packets for properties, Sold for Costs, to the Plaintiff must include;
 - The law firms cover letter stating plaintiff vesting instructions.
 - Two completed Pennsylvania Realty Transfer Tax Statement of Value Forms with original signatures on both.
 - One copy of the complete mortgage and assignment of mortgage.
 - Two self-addressed stamped envelopes for the return of the recorded deed.
 - Open invoices must be paid prior to the recording of the deed.
 - Case refunds will be mailed with the cost sheet after the deed has been recorded.
- If you wish to participate in the auction and do not have access to a computer, Bid4Assets website can be accessed on mobile devices and tablets. An "offline" bid packet can be obtained by contacting Bid4Assets.

Terms and conditions are subject to change by the Sheriff and Bid4Assets.

3/26, 4/2, & 4/9

ESTATE NOTICES

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that in the estates of the decedents set forth below, the Register of Wills has granted letters, testamentary of or administration to the persons named. All persons having claims or demands against said estates are requested to make known the same, and all persons indebted to said estates are requested to make payment without delay to the executors or administrators or their attorneys named below.

FIRST PUBLICATION**ESTATE OF MARY TRUMBOWER CROCKETT, DEC'D**

Late of Straban Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executor: William J. Crockett, 1400 Baritone Court, Vienna, VA 22182

ESTATE OF CHARLES EDWARD FITZWATER, JR. a/k/a CHARLES E. FITZWATER, JR., DEC'D

Late of Butler Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executor: George Flook, Jr., c/o Barbara Entwistle, Esq., Entwistle & Roberts, PC, 37 West Middle Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325

Attorney: Barbara Entwistle, Esq., Entwistle & Roberts, PC, 37 West Middle Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325

ESTATE OF ARLENE V. MILLER, DEC'D

Late of Union Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executrix: Kaye A. Doss, c/o Samuel A. Gates, Esq., Gates & Gates, P.C., 250 York Street, Hanover, PA 17331

Attorney: Samuel A. Gates, Esq., Gates & Gates, P.C., 250 York Street, Hanover, PA 17331

ESTATE OF EUGENE P. MILLER a/k/a EUGENE PAUL MILLER, DEC'D

Late of Reading Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Co-Executors: Robert Lee Miller Sr., 419 McCosh Street, Hanover, PA 17331; Ann B. Miller, 419 McCosh Street, Hanover, PA 17331

Attorney: Amy E.W. Ehrhart, Esq., 118 Carlisle Street, Suite 202, Hanover, PA 17331

ESTATE OF MARIE L. REDDING, DEC'D

Late of Butler Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Co-Executors: Sandra Heisey, 222 Mackin Avenue, Lancaster, PA 17602; Samuel Redding, 265 Benders Church Road, Biglerville, PA 17307; Anthony Redding, 198 Guernsey Road, Biglerville, PA 17307

Attorney: Adam D. Boyer, Esq., Barley Snyder, LLP, 123 Baltimore Street, Suite 101, Gettysburg, PA 17325

SECOND PUBLICATION**ESTATE OF DAVID M. KAAS, DEC'D**

Late of Cumberland Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Douglas A. Kaas, c/o Jessica Fisher Greene, Esq., Walters & Galloway, PLLC, 54 East Main Street, Mechanicsburg, PA 17055

Attorney: Jessica Fisher Greene, Esq., Walters & Galloway, PLLC, 54 East Main Street, Mechanicsburg, PA 17055

ESTATE OF DELLA V. LAMER a/k/a DELLA V. SNYDER, DEC'D

Late of the Borough of Littlestown, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executors: Donald L. Snyder, 170 Honda Road, Littlestown, PA 17340; Kay R. Stuffle, 90 Kensington Drive, Littlestown, PA 17340

Attorney: Elinor Albright Rebert, Esq., 515 Carlisle Street, Hanover, PA 17331

ESTATE OF DONALD E. NOACK a/k/a DONALD ELGIN NOACK, DEC'D

Late of the Borough of Littlestown, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Co-Executrixes: Sandra N. Monto, 11 Revere Court, Littlestown, PA 17340; Nancy Noack Beth, 17509 Cherokee Lane, Olney, MD 20832

Attorney: Amy E.W. Ehrhart, Esq., 118 Carlisle Street, Suite 202, Hanover, PA 17331

ESTATE OF G. RICHARD REAVER, a/k/a GLENN RICHARD REAVER, DEC'D

Late of Mt. Joy Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executors: Donna L. Ohler, 39 Park Avenue, Littlestown, PA 17340; David R. Reaver, 775 Marsh Creek Road, Gettysburg, PA 17325

Attorney: Puhl & Thrasher, 220 Baltimore Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325

ESTATE OF RICHARD N. REDDING, DEC'D

Late of the Borough of Gettysburg, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Richard T. Redding, 1001 Herr's Ridge Road, Gettysburg, PA 17325; Barbara A. Klunk, 50 Shady Lane, Hanover, PA 17331; Daniel J. Redding, 21 Ivy Lane, Gettysburg, PA 17325

Attorney: David K. James, III, Esq., 234 Baltimore Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325

ESTATE OF TYNIA T. RICHARDSON a/k/a TYNIA TREMBOW RICHARDSON, DEC'D

Late of Hamiltonban Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Co-Executors: Edward Todd Richardson, 13154 Welty Road, Waynesboro, PA 17268; Christopher Paul Richardson, 1037 Orrtanna Road, Orrtanna, PA 17353; Eric Steven Richardson, 13189 Seneca Drive, Waynesboro, PA 17268

Attorney: Adam D. Boyer, Esq., Barley Snyder, LLP, 123 Baltimore Street, Suite 101, Gettysburg, PA 17325

ESTATE OF GRACE R. RUPPERT, DEC'D

Late of Berwick Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executor: Brian L. Ruppert, c/o Sharon E. Myers, Esq., CGA Law Firm, PC, P.O. Box 606, East Berlin, PA 17316

Attorney: Sharon E. Myers, Esq., CGA Law Firm, PC, P.O. Box 606, East Berlin, PA 17316

ESTATE OF BARBARA JEAN SANDERS, DEC'D

Late of Washington County, Maryland

Executor: David A. Sanders, 16601 Tammany Manor Road, Williamsport, MD 21795

Attorney: Lawrence R. Rife, IV, Esq., Hoskinson, Wenger & Rife, 147 East Washington Street, Chambersburg, PA 17201

ESTATE OF BENJAMIN WEAVER a/k/a BENJAMIN N. WEAVER, SR., DEC'D

Late of Menallen Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Administrator CTA: William C. Hondos, c/o Scott L. Kelley, Esq., Barley Snyder, LLP, 14 Center Square, Hanover, PA 17331

Attorney: Scott L. Kelley, Esq., Barley Snyder, LLP, 14 Center Square, Hanover, PA 17331

THIRD PUBLICATION**ESTATE OF JULAINE T. AYERS, DEC'D**

Late of the Borough of Carroll Valley,
Adams County, Pennsylvania

Administrator: Timothy R. Ayers, c/o
R. Thomas Murphy, Esq., R.
Thomas Murphy & Associates, P.C.,
2005 East Main Street, Waynesboro,
PA 17268

Attorney: R. Thomas Murphy, Esq., R.
Thomas Murphy & Associates, P.C.,
2005 East Main Street, Waynesboro,
PA 17268

**ESTATE OF DAVID EDWARD
BAUMGARDNER, DEC'D**

Late of Reading Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Lonnie Lee Baumgardner, 202 White
Dogwood Drive, Etners, PA 17319

Attorney: Aaron C. Jackson, Esq.,
Jackson Law Firm, PLLC., 1215
Manor Drive, Suite 202,
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055

**ESTATE OF WANDA JEAN
BAUMGARDNER, DEC'D**

Late of Reading Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Lonnie Lee Baumgardner, 202 White
Dogwood Drive, Etners, PA 17319

Attorney: Aaron C. Jackson, Esq.,
Jackson Law Firm, PLLC., 1215
Manor Drive, Suite 202,
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055

**ESTATE OF WILLIAM M. CLEVELAND,
DEC'D**

Late of Straban Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Executor: PCNB Bank, c/o Christine
Settle, P.O. Box 4566, Gettysburg,
PA 17325

Attorney: Robert E. Campbell, Esq.,
Salzmann Hughes, P.C., 112
Baltimore Street, Gettysburg, PA
17325

**ESTATE OF FRANK J. MALSKY a/k/a
FRANK MALSKI, DEC'D**

Late of Mount Joy Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Barbara A. Keyton, 1036 Heritage
Drive, Gettysburg, PA 17325

Attorney: David K. James, III, Esq.,
234 Baltimore Street, Gettysburg,
PA 17325

ESTATE OF BONITA A. McCLEARY, DEC'D

Late of Butler Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Executors: Blake Milton McCleary,
124 Beecherstown Road, Biglerville,
PA 17307; Brynn Alyson McCleary
Penney, 212 Beecherstown Road,
Biglerville, PA 17307

Attorney: Robert L. McQuaide, Esq.,
Barley Snyder, 123 Baltimore Street,
Suite 101, Gettysburg, PA 17325

**ESTATE OF ANNA BELLE MUMMERT,
DEC'D**

Late of Straban Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Executrix: Diane M. Yerkey, 151
McAllister Street, Hanover, PA
17331

Attorney: Elinor Albright Rebert, Esq.,
515 Carlisle Street, Hanover, PA
17331

ESTATE OF EDWARD M. RESH, DEC'D

Late of Oxford Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Executor: Steven F. Resh, 104 Sunset
Drive, LaVale, MD 21502

Attorney: Elinor Albright Rebert, Esq.,
515 Carlisle Street, Hanover, PA
17331

**ESTATE OF NORMAN L. RUDISILL, JR.,
DEC'D**

Late of the Borough of Gettysburg,
Adams County, Pennsylvania

Debbie A. Leatherman, 255 Shriver's
Corner Road, Gettysburg, PA 17325

Attorney: Thomas R. Nell, Esq., 130
W. King Street, P.O. Box 1019, East
Berlin, PA 17316

**ESTATE OF TIMOTHY ALLEN SMITH,
DEC'D**

Late of Huntington Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Administrator: Timothy A. Smith II,
7505 Carlisle Pike, York Springs, PA
17372

Attorney: John C. Zepp, III, Esq., P.O.
Box 204, 8438 Carlisle Pike, York
Springs, PA 17372

**ESTATE OF BRUCE S. TOMA a/k/a
BRUCE STUART TOMA, DEC'D**

Late of the Borough of Carroll Valley,
Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executor: Sally A. Toma, c/o R.
Thomas Murphy, Esq., R. Thomas
Murphy & Associates, P.C., 2005
East Main Street, Waynesboro, PA
17268

Attorney: R. Thomas Murphy, Esq., R.
Thomas Murphy & Associates, P.C.,
2005 East Main Street, Waynesboro,
PA 172684

ESTATE OF TORY J. WEIKERT, DEC'D

Late of Butler Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Administratrix: Heather J. Weikert,
1466 Russell Tavernon Road,
Gettysburg, PA 17325

Attorney: Bernard A. Yannetti, Jr., Esq.
Hartman & Yannetti, 126 Baltimore
Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325