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INCORPORATION NOTICE

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that articles of Incorporation have been filed with the Department of State of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania on 5/2/16 for the Incorporation of IMOBILE OF GETTYSBURG PA, Inc. under the provisions of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law of 1988. The corporation shall engage in all lawful purposes, together with any legal function of a corporation under PA law. The initial registered office of the corporation is 600 N. Second St., Harrisburg, PA 17101.

5/20

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that HILLTOP COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, a Pennsylvania corporation with a mailing address of P.O. Box 117, Abbottstown, PA 17301, is being dissolved and is now engaged in wind-up proceedings so that its corporate existence shall be ended pursuant to §1975(b) of Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law of 1988, as amended.

Elizabeth A. Haney
President
Hilltop Community Association

5/20

FICTITIOUS NAME NOTICE

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that an Application for Registration of Fictitious Name was filed in the Department of State of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on March 14 2016 for B.S.D. CONSTRUCTION located at 139 N 2nd St., McSherrystown, PA 17344. The name and address of each individual interested in the business is Brandon Dehoff, 139 N. 2nd St., McSherrystown, PA 17344. This was filed in accordance with 54 PaC.S. 311.

5/20

NOTICE

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a Foreign Registration Statement was filed with the Department of State of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania for OLDE GLORY CONTRACTORS, INC. on or about May 3, 2016. The said corporation has been organized pursuant to laws as set forth in Corporations and Associations Article, Section 2-103 of the Annotated Code of Maryland of the laws of the State of Maryland, with its principal office at 2450 Silver Meadow Lane, Westminster, Maryland, 21158.

The principal Pennsylvania registered office of Olde Glory Contractors, Inc. shall be 3830 C Baltimore Pike, Littlestown, 17340, Adams County, Pennsylvania and shall be deemed for venue and official publication purposes to be located in Adams County.

Shultis Law, LLC
Ann C. Shultis, Esq.
Attorney for Olde Glory Contractors, Inc.

5/20

COMMONWEALTH V. GERALD CARROL CLARK

1. In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence claim regarding the determination of sexually violent predator status, an appellate court should only reverse the trial court if the Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient to enable the trial court to determine that each element required by the statute has been satisfied.

2. After a defendant is convicted of an offense specified in Section 9799.14, the trial court must order an assessment to be completed by the State Sexual Offenders Assessment Board.

3. Importantly, in weighing the various assessment factors, there is no statutory requirement that all of them, nor any particular number of them, be present or absent in order to support a sexual violent predator designation.

4. Under well-settled principles of law, there is a heavy burden of persuasion upon one who questions the constitutionality of an act as a strong presumption exists that legislative enactments do not violate the constitution.

5. It is important to determine whether the Act provisions are civil and non-punitive, or, on the other hand, whether it is a law aimed at inflicting punitive consequences. Pennsylvania courts have considered the issue raised by Appellant on multiple occasions in the context of prior similar legislation and have concluded that registration, notification, and counseling requirements do not constitute punishment.

6. Appellate authority is clear that non-punitive statutory provisions are not subject to the same due process rights which accompany punitive laws. The requirements of the Act have been characterized as collateral consequences of Appellant's plea as they cannot be considered to have a definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on defendant's punishment.

7. Appellant was not sentenced to a lesser or greater sentence as a result of his designation as a sexually violent predator. Rather, at the conclusion of hearing prior to sentencing, the Court determined the Appellant to be a sexually violent predator pursuant to the provisions of the Act. This determination did not, in any way, impact his sentence.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ADAMS COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA, CRIMINAL CP-01-CR-1094-2013,
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA V. GERALD CARROL
CLARK

Megan C. Zei, Esq., for Commonwealth
Thomas R. Nell, Esq., for Defendant

George, J., April 1, 2016

OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925(A)

Appellant, Gerald Carrol Clark, entered pleas of guilty to failure to comply with the registration requirements applicable to sexual offenders¹ and indecent assault.² Appellant's pleas were entered pursuant to a plea agreement which called for him to be sentenced to an aggregate term of no less than six years and three months nor more than 15 years in a state correctional institution. Pursuant to statutory authority, sentencing was delayed in order to refer Appellant to the Pennsylvania Sexual Offenders Board for purposes of evaluation as to whether he qualified as a sexually violent predator pursuant to Section 9799.24 of Pennsylvania's Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (hereinafter "Act") (relating to assessments).³ Following receipt of the assessment by the board, the Commonwealth filed Notice of Intention to Classify Appellant as a Sexually Violent Predator. On June 16, 2014, the Court conducted hearing on the Commonwealth's request. Evidence was presented at the hearing by stipulation wherein the parties stipulated to the qualifications of Dr. Robert Stein and the results of his examination of the Appellant. Appellant, represented by counsel, did not present any evidence. Based upon the stipulated testimony, the Court determined Appellant to be a sexually violent predator as defined in the Act by clear and convincing evidence. Appellant subsequently filed the current appeal claiming the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he is a sexually violent predator.⁴ Additionally, Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the Act's assessment process claiming his due process rights had been violated by depriving him of a jury trial and

¹ T 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4915.1

² 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7)

³ 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9799.24(a) requires a trial court to order an individual to be assessed by the Pennsylvania Sexual Offenders Board at a time between conviction and sentencing.

⁴ Appellant was originally convicted upon entering a plea of guilty on January 17, 2014. Sentencing occurred on June 16, 2014. No direct appeal was filed. However, on June 1, 2015, Appellant filed a pro se Motion for Post Conviction Collateral Relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Court appointed P.C.R.A. counsel to represent Appellant. Appointed counsel was further granted opportunity to file an Amended P.C.R.A. Petition in compliance with statutory authority. Thereafter, an Amended P.C.R.A. Petition was timely filed which included a claim that trial counsel abandoned Appellant on direct appeal. After pre-hearing conference, this Court conducted hearing on October 19, 2015. By Order dated December 21, 2015, Appellant's P.C.R.A. Petition was granted to the extent trial counsel was ineffective in failing to timely perfect an appeal. Accordingly, Appellant's post sentence rights were reinstated. This direct appeal follows. See *Commonwealth v. Lane*, 81 A.3d 974 (Pa. Super. 2013).

applying a lower standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, he claims the Act is unconstitutionally vague.⁵

In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence claim regarding the determination of sexually violent predator status, an appellate court should only reverse the trial court if the Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient to enable the trial court to determine that each element required by the statute has been satisfied. *Commonwealth v. Haughwout*, 837 A.2d 480, 484 (Pa. Super. 2003). A sexually violent predator is defined as a “person who has been *convicted of a sexually violent offense* as set forth in [section 9799.14 (relating to sexual offenses and tier system)] and who is determined to be a sexually violent predator under [section 9799.24] (relating to assessments) *due to a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes a person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.*” *Commonwealth v. Krouse*, 799 A.2d 835, 838 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc), *appeal denied*, 573 Pa. 671, 821 A.2d 586 (2003) (emphasis in original). The statute specifically details the process by which an individual is determined to be a sexually violent predator. After a defendant is convicted of an offense specified in Section 9799.14, the trial court must order an assessment to be completed by the State Sexual Offenders Assessment Board. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.24. The assessment must include, but is not limited to, an examination of:

1. Facts of current offense, including:
 - (i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims.
 - (ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense.
 - (iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim.
 - (iv) Relationship with the individual to the victim.
 - (v) Age of the victim.
 - (vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual cruelty by the individual during the commission of the crime.
 - (vii) The mental capacity of the victim.
2. Prior offense history, including

⁵ Appellant also claimed the Act’s assessment process violates his right against self-incrimination in that he is required to cooperate during an interview by the board or suffer a negative inference from his failure to do so. As the Act contains no such negative inference, this issue is meritless.

- (i) The individual's prior criminal record.
 - (ii) Whether the individual completed any prior sentences.
 - (iii) Whether the individual participated in available programs for sexual offenders.
3. Characteristics of the individual, including:
- (i) Age.
 - (ii) Use of illegal drugs.
 - (iii) Any mental illness, mental disability or mental abnormality.
 - (iv) Behavioral characteristics that contributed to the individual's conduct.
4. Factors that are supported in a sexual offender assessment field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of reoffense.

42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.24. Importantly, in weighing the various assessment factors, there is no statutory requirement that all of them, nor any particular number of them, be present or absent in order to support a sexual violent predator designation. *Commonwealth v. Feucht*, 955 A.2d 377, 381 (Pa. Super. 2008). Thus, the Commonwealth does not have to show that any certain factor is present or absent in a particular case. *Id.*⁶

The assessment at issue was the result of Appellant's guilty plea to having indecent contact for the purpose of arousing sexual desire with a child under the age of 13. 18 Pa. C.S. § 3126(a)(7). The charge involved allegations that Appellant lowered the clothing of a 12-year-old female while she was sleeping and was observed to be rubbing her naked buttocks by the child's natural mother. During forensic interview, the child indicated that Appellant had been touching her "private area" on a nightly basis for approximately a month before being observed by the child's mother. At the time of the commission of this crime, Appellant was already required to register as a sexual offender as a result of a third-degree felony sex offense conviction in the state of Maryland in 2003.⁷ Charging documents from the Maryland offense included allegations Appellant digitally penetrated the vaginal area of a 13-year-old girl. Pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. §

⁶ Although *Feucht* considered the various assessment factors under prior Megan Law provisions, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9795.4 (repealed), this Court finds the reasoning persuasive and equally applicable under almost identical statutory provisions.

⁷ As previously mentioned, Appellant also pled guilty before this Court for failure to comply with the registration requirements applicable to sexual offenders, 18 Pa. C.S. § 4915.1.

9799.14(d)(8), the indecent assault charge to which Appellant currently pled guilty is classified as a Tier III sexual offense subjecting Appellant to assessment.

At hearing, the sole evidence presented consisted of the report of Dr. Stein which concluded that Appellant met the criteria to be classified as a sexually violent predator under the Act. Relevant to this opinion, Dr. Stein noted that the age of the victim is consistent with sexual deviance. Dr. Stein further took into account a history of non-compliance with prior sentences including a failure to report under the former Megan's Law. He noted that the Appellant's prior criminal record which included a sex offense was consistent with a paraphilic disorder⁸ or disorder of sexual deviance. He also noted a history of illegal drug use by Appellant and noted that the age difference of 31 years between Appellant and the victim was indicative of sexual deviance. In reviewing the mental abnormality and personality disorder criterion, Dr. Stein concluded Appellant has a congenital condition which is the impetus to sexual offending and which is not curable. He opined that Appellant's harbored sexual interest for children over many years evidenced the existence of a condition which overrode emotional/volitional control, and that there was a likelihood Appellant would reoffend in the future if permitted unsupervised contact with young girls. Finally, Dr. Stein concluded that Appellant's multiple acts of sexually touching a minor child served to promote a sexually victimizing relationship and was sufficient evidence to establish predatory behavior as defined by the Act. Based upon this uncontested evidence, Appellant's classification as a sexually violent predator is amply supported by the record.

Appellant next raises a number of constitutional challenges to the viability of the Act. He claims the Act cannot survive constitutional scrutiny as it deprives him of due process by permitting the finding of a sexually violent predator in a nonjury proceeding requiring a lesser standard of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, without specificity, Appellant claims the Act to be unconstitutionally vague.

As Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the Act, it is impor-

⁸ Paraphilic Disorder is defined in The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostics and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) as "a sexual desire or behavior that involves another person's psychological distress, injury, or death, or a desire for sexual behaviors involving unwilling persons or persons unable to give legal consent."

tant to summarize the well-established principles which guide this discussion. Primarily, a statute may only be found unconstitutional if it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates constitutional rights. *Commonwealth v. Cotto*, 753 A.2d 217, 219 (Pa. 2000). Under well-settled principles of law, there is a heavy burden of persuasion upon one who questions the constitutionality of an act as a strong presumption exists that legislative enactments do not violate the constitution. *Commonwealth v. Long*, 831 A.2d 737, 743 (Pa. Super. 2003).

A second controlling consideration in this discussion is the nature of the Act's requirements. More specifically, it is important to determine whether the Act provisions are civil and non-punitive, or, on the other hand, whether it is a law aimed at inflicting punitive consequences. Pennsylvania courts have considered the issue raised by Appellant on multiple occasions in the context of prior similar legislation and have concluded that registration, notification, and counseling requirements do not constitute punishment. See e.g., *Commonwealth v. Williams*, 832 A.2d 962, 986 (Pa. 2003) (upholding as non-punitive the registration, notification, and counseling provisions of Megan's Law II); See also *Commonwealth v. Rhoads*, 836 A.2d 159 (Pa. Super. 2003) (same). Although *Williams* and *Rhoads* address the requirements under prior versions of Megan's Law, the Superior Court more recently upheld the constitutionality of the Act's registration requirements in *Commonwealth v. Perez*, 97 A.3d 747 (Pa. Super. 2014). See also *Commonwealth v. McDonough*, 96 A.3d 1067 (Pa. Super. 2014). As this authority is binding on the trial court, it is clear that the provisions of the Act do not constitute criminal punishment.

Having properly focused the issue in the context of current appellate authority, Appellant's constitutional challenges are meritless. Appellate authority is clear that non-punitive statutory provisions are not subject to the same due process rights which accompany punitive laws. See *Commonwealth v. Williams*, *supra* (holding due process constitutional challenges are without merit where statutory provisions are considered non-punitive). The requirements of the Act have been characterized as collateral consequences of Appellant's plea as they cannot be considered to have a definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on defendant's punishment. *Commonwealth v. McDonough*, 96 A.3d 1067, 1071 (Pa.

Super. 2014). As such, the Act does not violate the due process protections of the constitution.

Appellant also challenges the Act alleging that he was “illegally” sentenced under the sexually violent predator section of the Act. In this context, he claims the Act is unconstitutionally vague. The manner in which this issue is raised makes it impossible for this Court to respond. Appellant was not sentenced under the Act but rather was sentenced under provisions of the Sentencing Code relating to his convictions for a felony of the second degree and felony of the third degree. 101 Pa. Code § 15.66(b) (relating to maximum penalties for convictions of second and third degree felonies). Ironically, Appellant’s sentences were imposed pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. Appellant was not sentenced to a lesser or greater sentence as a result of his designation as a sexually violent predator. Rather, at the conclusion of hearing prior to sentencing, the Court determined the Appellant to be a sexually violent predator pursuant to the provisions of the Act. This determination did not, in any way, impact his sentence. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim is neither factually accurate nor clearly defined in a manner sufficient to permit this Court further analysis. As such, it is both meritless and waived. *Commonwealth v. Heggins*, 809 A.2d 908, 911 (Pa. Super. 2002) (an insufficiently specific or vague concise statement which hinders a court’s ability to analyze an issue amounts to waiver of the issue).

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court’s determination that the Appellant is a sexually violent predator be affirmed.

ESTATE NOTICES

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that in the estates of the decedents set forth below, the Register of Wills has granted letters, testamentary of or administration to the persons named. All persons having claims or demands against said estates are requested to make known the same, and all persons indebted to said estates are requested to make payment without delay to the executors or administrators or their attorneys named below.

FIRST PUBLICATION

ESTATE OF E. RONALD COMFORT
a/k/a EDMUND RONALD COMFORT,
DEC'D

Late of the Borough of Gettysburg,
Adams County, Pennsylvania

Personal Representative: Mara C.
Lynaugh, 5715 Billings Road, Mt.
Hood, Parkdale, OR 97041

Attorney: Dennis M. Twigg, Esq.,
Hoffman, Comfort, Offutt, Scott &
Halstad, LLP, 24 North Court Street,
Westminster, MD 21157

ESTATE OF EVELYN L. FOREMAN,
DEC'D

Late of Germany Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Connie S. Althoff, 17 Old Bachmans
Valley Road, Westminster, MD
21157

Attorney: David K. James, III, Esq.,
234 Baltimore St., Gettysburg, PA
17325

ESTATE OF PEARL L. GERRICK, DEC'D

Late of Berwick Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Jessica L. Phillips, 2210 Bon Ox Road,
New Oxford, PA 17350

Attorney: David K. James, III, Esq., 234
Baltimore St., Gettysburg, PA 17325

ESTATE OF DONALD H. HOLLABAUGH,
DEC'D

Late of Butler Township, Adams County,
Pennsylvania

Executor: Steven D. Hollabaugh, 271
Yellow Hill Road, Biglerville, PA
17307

Attorney: Puhl, Eastman & Thrasher,
220 Baltimore Street, Gettysburg, PA
17325

ESTATE OF ESTATE OF WILLIAM T.
KENT a/k/a WILLIAM KENT SR., DEC'D

Late of the Borough of Bonneauville,
Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executrix: Charlene Erickson a/k/a
Sharlene Eriksen, 29 Bonriefield
Circle, Gettysburg, PA 17325

Attorney: Robert E. Campbell, Esq.,
Campbell & White, P.C., 112
Baltimore Street, Gettysburg, PA
17325

ESTATE OF JAMES D. KILMER, DEC'D

Late of the Borough of Gettysburg,
Adams County, Pennsylvania

Administrators: Ralph J. Kilmer,
Christine L. Kilmer, 114 West Middle
Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325

Attorney: Teeter, Teeter & Teeter, 108
West Middle Street, Gettysburg, PA
17325

ESTATE OF LESLIE R. LOBB, DEC'D

Late of the Borough of Carroll Valley,
Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executor: David W. Karppala, 270
Friendship Lane, Gettysburg, PA
17325

SECOND PUBLICATION

ESTATE OF ALLAN G. BLUE a/k/a
ALLAN GRANT BLUE, DEC'D

Late of Menallan Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Executor: R. Joseph Landy, 228
Desmond Street, P.O. Box 206,
Sayre, PA 18840-0206

Attorney: R. Joseph Landy, Esq., Landy
& Rossettie, PLLC, 228 Desmond
Street, P.O. Box 206, Sayre, PA
18840-0206

ESTATE OF RICHARD E. CHAMBERS,
DEC'D

Late of Franklin Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Administratrix: Elisabeth A. Chambers,
c/o Robert C. Saidis, Esq., Saidis,
Sullivan & Rogers, 100 Sterling
Parkway, Suite 100, Mechanicsburg,
Pennsylvania 17050

Attorney: Robert C. Saidis, Esq., Saidis,
Sullivan & Rogers, 100 Sterling
Parkway, Suite 100, Mechanicsburg,
Pennsylvania 17050

ESTATE OF J. NORMAND FRONTAIN,
DEC'D

Late of the Borough of Littlestown,
Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executor: Kenneth S. Frontain, c/o
David A. Mills, Esq., Blakey, Yost,
Bupp & Rausch, LLP, 17 E. Market
Street, York, PA 17401

Attorney: David A. Mills, Esq., Blakey,
Yost, Bupp & Rausch, LLP, 17 E.
Market Street, York, PA 17401

ESTATE OF WREATHA E. GLATFELTER,
DEC'D

Late of Huntington Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Co-Executors: Vicki D. Wagaman and
Roger L. Wagaman, c/o Sharon E.
Myers, Esq., CGA Law Firm, PC, PO
Box 606, East Berlin, PA 17316

Attorney: Sharon E. Myers, Esq., CGA
Law Firm, PC, PO Box 606, East
Berlin, PA 17316

ESTATE OF CLAANNA ELIZABETH
GREGG a/k/a CLAANNA E. GREGG,
DEC'D

Late of Union Township, Adams County,
Pennsylvania

Administrator c.t.a: Mary Rae Stouten,
1742 Mayfair Place, Crofton, MD
21114

Attorney: Puhl, Eastman & Thrasher,
220 Baltimore Street, Gettysburg, PA
17325

ESTATE OF MARIAN J. KNIPPLE, DEC'D

Late of Germany Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Executrix: Linda K. Newman, 80 Locust
Drive, Littlestown, PA 17340

Attorney: Robert L. McQuaide, Esq.,
Suite 204, 18 Carlisle Street,
Gettysburg, PA 17325

ESTATE OF FRANK W. MERRBAUGH,
JR., DEC'D

Late of Hamilton Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Executrix: Mrs. Dawn H. Merrbaugh, 10
Foxtown Drive, Abbottstown, PA
17301

Attorney: Todd A. King, Esq., Campbell
& White, P.C., 112 Baltimore Street,
Suite 1, Gettysburg, PA 17325-2311

SECOND PUBLICATION CONTINUED**ESTATE OF JEANETTE C. WILT, DEC'D**

Late of the Borough of Littlestown,
Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executor: James Redding, Sr., 760
Bollinger Road, Littlestown, PA
17340

Attorney: George W. Swartz, II, Esq.,
Mooney & Associates, 230 York
Street, Hanover, PA 17331

ESTATE OF BARBARA J. WINES, DEC'D

Late of the Borough of
McSherrystown, Adams County,
Pennsylvania

Executrix: Martha M. Potter, 598
Wagaman Avenue, Georgetown, DE
19947

Attorney: David C. Smith, Esq., 754
Edgegrove Road, Hanover, PA 17331

TRUST NOTICE

Trust: THE TRUST OF ALLAN G.
BLUE DATED MARCH 1, 1994

Deceased: ALLAN G. BLUE a/k/a
ALLAN GRANT BLUE

Date of Death: APRIL 2, 2016

Late of Menallan Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

M&T Bank, Co-Trustee
1100 Wehrle Drive
Buffalo, NY 14221

R. Joseph Landy, Co-Trustee
741 South Main Street
Athens, PA 18810

Attorney: R. Joseph Landy, Esq.
LANDY & ROSSETTIE, PLLC
228 Desmond Street, P.O. Box 206
Sayre, PA 18840-0206

THIRD PUBLICATION**ESTATE OF E. MAXINE IRVIN a/k/a ELSIE
M. IRVIN a/k/a ELSIE MAXINE IRVIN,
DEC'D**

Late of the Borough of East Berlin,
Adams County, Pennsylvania

Co-Executors: Frances Kammerer and
Edwin Kammerer, c/o Sharon E.
Myers, Esq., CGA Law Firm, PC, PO
Box 606, East Berlin, PA 17316

Attorney: Sharon E. Myers, Esq., CGA
Law Firm, PC, PO Box 606, East
Berlin, PA 17316

**ESTATE OF LEONARD E. MARSICO,
DEC'D**

Late of Oxford Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

John M. Crabbs 202 Broadway
Hanover, PA 17331

Attorney: Ruth M. Gunnell, Esq.,
Crabbs & Crabbs, 202 Broadway
Hanover, PA 17331

**ESTATE OF CHARLES W. MATTERN,
DEC'D**

Late of Latimore Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Amelia B. Mattern, 724 Quaker Church
Road, York Springs, PA 17372

Attorney: Brian C. Linsenbach, Esq.,
Stone, Wiley, & Linsenbach, PC, 3 N.
Baltimore Street, Dillsburg, PA 17019

ESTATE OF ROMAIN E. MYERS, DEC'D

Late of Oxford Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Co-Executors: Barbara Heim and Gary
Myers, c/o Sharon E. Myers, Esq.,
CGA Law Firm, PC, PO Box 606,
East Berlin, PA 17316

Attorney: Sharon E. Myers, Esq., CGA
Law Firm, PC, PO Box 606, East
Berlin, PA 17316

**ESTATE OF CYNTHIA J. ORNER,
DEC'D**

Late of Hamilton Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Administrator: Jack C. Orner, Jr., 120 E.
King Street, East Berlin, PA 17316

Attorney: Clayton A. Lingg, Esq.,
Mooney & Associates, 230 York
Street, Hanover, PA 17331

ESTATE OF SHIRLEY M. PRICE, DEC'D

Late of Straban Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Executor: Clayton A. Lingg, Esq., 230
York Street, Hanover, PA 17331

Attorney: Clayton A. Lingg, Esq.,
Mooney & Associates, 230 York
Street, Hanover, PA 17331

**ESTATE OF JAMES C. ROHRER a/k/a
JAMES CLARENCE ROHRER, DEC'D**

Late of Straban Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Executrix: Barbara A. Bankert, c/o
Samuel A. Gates, Esq., Gates &
Gates, P.C., 250 York Street,
Hanover, PA 17331

Attorney: Samuel A. Gates, Esq., Gates
& Gates, P.C., 250 York Street,
Hanover, PA 17331

**ESTATE OF KATHERN L. TOMASZEWSKI,
DEC'D**

Late of Oxford Township, Adams
County, Pennsylvania

Administratrix: Gladys Elaine Luther, 6565
Old Harrisburg Rd., York Springs, PA
17372

Attorney: Clayton A. Lingg, Esq.,
Mooney & Associates, 230 York
Street, Hanover, PA 17331

