

# Adams County Legal Journal


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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA V.  
JOLEECIA BREYNON PEARSON



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IN THE COURT OF  
COMMON PLEAS OF  
ADAMS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL ACTION-LAW  
NO. 15-S-1171

NOTICE OF ACTION IN  
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE

Bank of America, N.A., Plaintiff  
vs.

Vivian Luckenbaugh a/k/a Vivian M. Luckenbaugh, Individually and as Known Heir of Albert Luckenbaugh a/k/a Albert L. Luckenbaugh, Sr., Albert Luckenbaugh, Jr., Known Heir of Albert Luckenbaugh a/k/a Albert L. Luckenbaugh, Sr., Caitlyn V.C. Eyer, Known Heir of Debra C. Eyer-Scott, Known Heir of Albert Luckenbaugh a/k/a Albert L. Luckenbaugh, Sr. and Unknown Heirs, Successors, Assigns and All Persons, Firms or Associations Claiming Right, Title or Interest From or Under Debra C. Eyer-Scott, Known Heir of Albert Luckenbaugh a/k/a Albert L. Luckenbaugh, Sr., Defendants

TO: Unknown Heirs, Successors, Assigns and All Persons, Firms or Associations Claiming Right, Title or Interest From or Under Debra C. Eyer-Scott, Known Heir of Albert Luckenbaugh a/k/a Albert L. Luckenbaugh, Sr., Defendant(s), whose last known address is 474 Hershey Heights Road, Hanover, PA 17331.

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT IN  
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that Plaintiff, Bank of America, N.A., has filed a Second Amended Mortgage Foreclosure Complaint endorsed with a Notice to Defend, against you in the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County, Pennsylvania, docketed to NO. 15-S-1171, wherein Plaintiff seeks to foreclose on the mortgage secured on your property located, 474 Hershey Heights Road, Hanover, PA 17331, whereupon your property would be sold by the Sheriff of Adams County.

NOTICE

YOU HAVE BEEN SUED IN COURT. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the notice above, you must take action within twenty (20) days after this Complaint and Notice are served, by

entering a written appearance personally or by attorney and filing in writing with the Court your defenses or objections to the claims set forth against you. You are warned that if you fail to do so the case may proceed without you and a judgment may be entered against you by the Court without further notice for any money claimed in the Complaint or for any other claim or relief requested by the Plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you.

YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW. THIS OFFICE CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH THE INFORMATION ABOUT HIRING A LAWYER. IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO HIRE A LAWYER, THIS OFFICE MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT AGENCIES THAT MAY OFFER LEGAL SERVICES TO ELIGIBLE PERSONS AT A REDUCED FEE OR NO FEE.

LAWYERS REFERRAL SERVICE  
Adams County Court Admin.  
Adams County Courthouse  
Gettysburg, PA 17325  
717-337-9846

Udren Law Offices, P.C.  
Attorneys for Plaintiff  
Udren Law Offices, P.C.  
111 Woodcrest Road, Suite 200  
Cherry Hill, NJ 08003  
856-669-5400

6/16

IN THE COURT OF  
COMMON PLEAS OF  
ADAMS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

2016-SU-1211

DONALD E. COLLINS, Plaintiff  
v.  
BARRY K. URIAN, JR., Defendant

NOTICE OF  
SCHEDULED HEARING

To: Barry K. Urian, Jr.  
1972 Jaguar, VIN #1S72553

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that a Complaint to Declare a Vehicle Abandoned Vehicle was filed on December 5, 2016, in the above-captioned case and a hearing is scheduled for July 21, 2017, at 8:30 a.m. in Courtroom #4, third floor of the Adams County Courthouse, 117 Baltimore Street, Gettysburg, PA.

YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP.

Adams County Court  
Administrator's Office  
Adams County Courthouse  
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, 17325  
Telephone: (717) 337-9846

6/16

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA V.  
JOLEECIA BREYNON PEARSON

1. The taking of a blood sample or the administration of a breath test is a search.  
2. Since Defendant's blood was taken at the request of law enforcement, the blood draw was a search and must comply with both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution to be admissible at trial.

3. As the Commonwealth has not established an exigent circumstance, Defendant's blood test results must be suppressed as an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution unless the Commonwealth establishes Defendant provided knowing and voluntary consent.

4. In order for consent to be valid, it must be unequivocal, specific, and voluntary. The appellant must have intentionally relinquished or abandoned a known right or privilege.

5. However, based upon a plain reading of the statute, it does not appear a police officer must read the DL-26 form to a person arrested for a DUI offense prior to asking the person to submit to a blood draw.

6. The Superior Court explained the implied consent law does not require that a motorist's consent to a chemical test be informed but does require that a motorist's refusal be informed.

7. It is within the suppression court's sole province as fact finder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be give to their testimony.

8. This Court is of the opinion that the Commonwealth has met its burden of establishing that Defendant's consent was the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice, objectively valid and not the product of police coercion, deceit, or misrepresentation.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ADAMS COUNTY,  
PENNSYLVANIA, CRIMINAL, CP-01-CR-1526-2016,  
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA V. JOLEECIA  
BREYNON PEARSON

Roy A. Keefer, Esq., Attorney for Commonwealth  
John R. Scheidemann, Esq., Attorney for Defendant  
Wagner, J., May 17, 2017

OPINION ON DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRE-TRIAL  
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Presently before the Court is Defendant Joleecia Breynon Pearson's Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion to Suppress Evidence filed on March 13, 2017. A suppression hearing was held on April 20, 2017. The issue before the Court is whether Defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to a blood draw following Defendant's legal arrest for DUI. Based upon the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this Court will deny Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence.

## FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Officer Ryan Eiker has been a police officer for 16 years and has been a police officer with Cumberland Township for the past 10 years.
2. On August 20, 2016 at approximately 2:38 a.m., Officer Eiker stopped a vehicle driven by Defendant.
3. Through stipulation, the parties agree that Officer Eiker possessed sufficient probable cause to stop Defendant's vehicle and place Defendant under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol.
4. Officer Eiker placed Defendant under arrest, handcuffed Defendant and transported Defendant to Gettysburg Hospital for a blood draw.
5. After Officer Eiker placed Defendant under arrest, but while at the scene, Officer Eiker advised Defendant he would like her to submit to a chemical test of her blood.
6. Officer Eiker removed Defendant's handcuffs prior to walking Defendant into Gettysburg Hospital.
7. While in Gettysburg Hospital, Officer Eiker asked Defendant whether she would submit to a chemical test of her blood. Officer Eiker cannot recall Defendant's specific response, but Defendant did consent to the blood test.
8. Defendant did not have any questions of Officer Eiker when he asked her to submit to a chemical test of her blood.
9. At Gettysburg Hospital, Defendant was cooperative and compliant at all times. When encountered by the lab technician, Defendant voluntarily extended her arm for the blood draw. There was no conversation concerning the blood test, nor did Defendant raise any question about the test or her need to submit to the test, nor did Defendant ever raise any concerns about submitting to a blood test. Additionally, Defendant never requested counsel or legal advice.
10. Officer Eiker did not read the DL-26 form to Defendant.
11. Officer Eiker never advised Defendant she had a right to refuse the blood test.

12. Blood was drawn at 3:27 a.m. and submitted to NMS Labs for testing. Defendant had a .184 blood alcohol level.

### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Officer Eiker had probable cause to stop Defendant's vehicle for DUI and probable cause to arrest Defendant for DUI.
2. Officer Eiker placed Defendant under arrest for driving under the influence prior to transporting Defendant to Gettysburg Hospital.
3. Defendant's consent to provide a blood sample was knowing and voluntary.

### LEGAL STANDARD

In a suppression hearing, the Commonwealth has the burden to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the admissibility of those items the accused seeks to preclude. **Commonwealth v. Ruey**, 892 A.2d 802, 807 (Pa. 2006).

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."<sup>1</sup> The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. **Commonwealth v. Kohl**, 615 A.2d 308, 311 (Pa. 1992). Pennsylvania's Constitution specifically guarantees citizens the right to be "secure in their persons . . . from unreasonable searches and seizures."<sup>2</sup> A search or seizure is reasonable only if "it is conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued by a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause." **Kohl**, 615 A.2d at 313. When police obtain evidence in violation of an individual's Fourth Amendment rights, the Commonwealth is precluded from using that evidence at trial. **Commonwealth v. Pratt**, 930 A.2d 561, 563 (Pa. Super. 2007).

"The taking of a blood sample or the administration of a breath test is a search." **Birchfield v. North Dakota**, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016). **See also Commonwealth v. Ellis**, 608 A.2d 1090, 1092 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citing **Commonwealth v. Hipp**, 551 A.2d 1086 (Pa.

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Const. amend. IV.

<sup>2</sup> Pa. Const. art. I, § 8.

1988)) (“The administration of a blood test is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if it is performed by an agent of the government.”). In the current case, the police officer requested Defendant provide a blood sample after arresting her for a DUI offense. Since Defendant’s blood was taken at the request of law enforcement, the blood draw was a search and must comply with both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution to be admissible at trial.

The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held “the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrest for drunk driving.”<sup>3</sup> **Birchfield**, 136 S. Ct. at 2184. Conversely, absent an exception to the warrant requirement, a blood test conducted without a warrant, “incident to a lawful drunk-driving arrest[,]” violates the Fourth Amendment.<sup>4</sup> **Id.** at 2185 n. 8.

#### DISCUSSION: KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY CONSENT

Here, Officer Eiker did not obtain a search warrant prior to the blood draw. As the Commonwealth has not established an exigent circumstance, Defendant’s blood test results must be suppressed as an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution unless the Commonwealth establishes Defendant provided knowing and voluntary consent.<sup>5</sup>

The stain of an unconstitutional search may be erased when an individual has validly consented to the search. **See Commonwealth v. Cleckley**, 738 A.2d 427, 429 (Pa. 1999) (citing **Commonwealth v. Slaton**, 608 A.2d 5, 8-9 (Pa. 1992)). Pennsylvania courts have employed an objective, totality of the circumstances approach in deciding whether an individual provided the necessary consent to search. **Smith**, 77 A.3d at 573. “In order for consent to be valid, it must be ‘unequivocal, specific, and voluntary.’ The appellant must

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<sup>3</sup> The Court found breath tests did not offend the Fourth Amendment since “breath tests are significantly less intrusive than blood tests and in most cases amply serve law enforcement interests . . . .” **Id.** at 2185.

<sup>4</sup> As compared to a breath test, blood tests entail a significant bodily intrusion, as well as implicate serious concerns regarding an individual’s privacy rights. **Id.** at 2178.

<sup>5</sup> The Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing Defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to the search. **Commonwealth v. Smith**, 77 A.3d 562, 573 (Pa. 2013).

have intentionally relinquished or abandoned a known right or privilege.” **Commonwealth v. Dunne**, 690 A.2d 1233, 1236 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citing **Commonwealth v. Gibson**, 638 A.2d 203, 207 (Pa. 1994)).

The **Smith** Court aptly stated:

In determining the validity of a given consent [to provide a blood sample], ‘the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that a consent is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice-not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne-under the totality of the circumstances.’ ‘The standard for measuring the scope of a person’s consent is based on an objective evaluation of what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the person who gave the consent.’ Such evaluation includes an objective examination of ‘the maturity, sophistication and mental or emotional state of the defendant. . . .’ Gauging the scope of a defendant’s consent is an inherent and necessary part of the process of determining, on the totality of the circumstances presented, whether the consent is objectively valid, or instead the product of coercion, deceit, or misrepresentation.

**Smith**, 77 A.3d at 573. (internal citations omitted).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also explained:

[e]valuation of the voluntariness of a defendant’s consent necessarily entails consideration of a variety of factors, factors which, of course, may vary depending on the circumstances. Accordingly, no hard and fast rule can be gleaned that would dictate what factors must be considered in each instance. We find instructive, however, the following factors considered by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia when evaluating the voluntariness of a defendant’s consent: 1) the defendant’s custodial status; 2) the use of duress or coercive tactics by law enforcement personnel; 3) the defendant’s knowledge of his right to refuse consent; 4) the defendant’s education

and intelligence; 5) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; and 6) the extent and level of the defendant's cooperation with the law enforcement personnel.

**Cleckley**, 738 A.2d at 433 n. 7 (Pa. 1999) (adopting the factors espoused by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia).

Here Defendant now claims that she did not knowingly and voluntarily consent to the blood draw. At the point Defendant consented to the blood draw she was under arrest and in custody. Given the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial arrest, this factor leans against a finding of a knowing and voluntary consent. Defendant was also never explicitly advised she had a right to refuse consent. See **Commonwealth v. Strickler**, 757 A.2d 884, 901 (Pa. 2000). However, this is not outcome determinative to a finding of knowing and voluntary consent. See **Cleckley**, 738 A.2d at 433 (“[O]ne’s knowledge of his or her right to refuse consent remains a factor to consider in determining the validity of consent; it simply is not a determinative factor since other evidence is oftentimes adequate to prove the voluntariness of a consent.”).

Defense Counsel appears to assert that a Defendant cannot provide knowing consent unless he is given the warnings contained in the DL-26 form. However, based upon a plain reading of the statute, it does not appear a police officer must read the DL-26 form to a person arrested for a DUI offense prior to asking the person to submit to a blood draw.<sup>6</sup> **75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1547(b)(1)** states “[i]f any person placed under arrest for a violation of section 3802 is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted. . . .” (emphasis added). If the person consents in response to an officer’s request for a blood draw, there is no need to provide an explanation of the consequences of a refusal.

In **Commonwealth v. McCoy**, 895 A.2d 18, 27 (Pa. Super. 2006), Defendant consented to a blood draw after being arrested for DUI.

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<sup>6</sup> This Court has found no case law suggesting a contrary reading of the statute. Conversely, since a license suspension and the enhanced criminal penalties are triggered when an individual refuses to submit to the blood test, a person must be given the warnings before either of those penalties can be imposed. See *Commonwealth v. Xander*, 14 A.3d 174, 179 (Pa. Super. 2011); *Weems v. Commonwealth*, Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 990 A.2d 1208, 1211-12 ( Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010).



On appeal Defendant claimed, among other things, his consent was invalid because the officer provided him with “incorrect implied consent warnings, gave incomplete warnings and gave an incorrect statement of the law. . . .” **Id.** at 24. <sup>7</sup> Specifically, he argued the warning failed to tell him that a person who refuses the chemical test will receive a sentencing enhancement. **Id.** at 27. The Superior Court found Defendant’s argument unpersuasive because Defendant had consented to the blood draw. **Id.** at 27-28. Citing an earlier case, the Superior Court explained the implied consent law “does not require that a motorist’s consent to a chemical test be informed but does require that a motorist’s refusal be informed.” (internal citation omitted). **Id.** at 28. Therefore, in the current case, because Defendant consented to the blood draw the fact she was never provided with the DL-26 form will not invalidate her consent.

It is within the suppression court’s sole province as fact finder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. **Commonwealth v. Griffin**, 785 A.2d 501, 505 (Pa. Super. 2001). The suppression court is free to believe all, some or none of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. **Id.** See also **Commonwealth v. Elmobdy**, 823 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 2003).

Defendant argues because of a prior DUI she was aware of the enhanced criminal penalties for refusal to submit to a blood draw. She claims this knowledge coerced her into consenting to the blood draw. However, Defendant never asked Officer Eiker any questions about whether a refusal would result in enhanced criminal penalties, nor did she express any concerns before consenting to the blood draw. This Court finds Defendant’s self-serving testimony inconsistent with her statements and actions of August 20, 2016 and therefore not credible.

Despite the fact Defendant was in custody at the time she consented, there are a number of factors leaning towards a finding of knowing and voluntary consent. While Defendant was technically under arrest, Defendant was not handcuffed when she walked into the hospital with Officer Eiker nor was she handcuffed when she submitted to the blood test. No evidence was presented to show Defendant was argumentative, belligerent, or uncooperative after her

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<sup>7</sup> The officer provided Defendant an older version of the DL-26 form. **Id.** at 27.

arrest. Defendant's consent to the blood draw was not the product of duress, threats, or coercion on the part of law enforcement. Officer Eiker did not use excessive police force nor did he promise Defendant anything in exchange for submitting to the blood draw. No testimony was presented that Officer Eiker's demeanor or expression was harsh or confrontational, or that he misrepresented the facts in an effort to get Defendant to consent to the blood draw. Defendant had a significant amount of time to consider Officer Eiker's request to submit to a blood draw prior to agreeing to the blood draw. This fact illustrates that Defendant's consent was the product of considered deliberation.

Furthermore, Defendant cannot claim the threat of criminal penalties contained in the DL-26 form coerced her into consenting. As mentioned previously, Officer Eiker testified he did not read the DL-26 form to Defendant nor did he make any reference to criminal penalties. Defendant's consent to the blood draw was not the product of duress or coercion on the part of law enforcement.

Upon consideration of the totality of all the factors present in this case, this Court is of the opinion that the Commonwealth has met its burden of establishing that Defendant's consent was the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice, objectively valid and not the product of police coercion, deceit or misrepresentation. Therefore, Defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to the search of her person and the warrantless blood draw was legal. Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied.

#### ORDER OF COURT

AND NOW, this 17th day of May, 2017, for the reasons set forth in the attached Opinion, Defendant's Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion is denied.

**ESTATE NOTICES**

**NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that in the estates of the decedents set forth below, the Register of Wills has granted letters, testamentary or of administration to the persons named. All persons having claims or demands against said estates are requested to make known the same, and all persons indebted to said estates are requested to make payment without delay to the executors or administrators or their attorneys named below.**

**FIRST PUBLICATION****ESTATE OF CHARLES E. ELBURN, SR., DEC'D**

Late of Germany Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Douglas N. Storm, c/o Scott J. Strausbaugh, Esq., Becker & Strausbaugh, P.C., 544 Carlisle Street, Hanover, PA 17331

Attorney: Scott J. Strausbaugh, Esq., Becker & Strausbaugh, P.C., 544 Carlisle Street, Hanover, PA 17331

**ESTATE OF JOHN D. GOULDEN, DEC'D**

Late of Hamilton Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executrices: Wanda S. Spahr and LaDonna L. Deatrick, c/o Barbara Jo Entwistle, Esq., Entwistle & Roberts, 37 West Middle Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325

Attorney: Barbara Jo Entwistle, Esq., Entwistle & Roberts, 37 West Middle Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325

**ESTATE OF DONALD C. UBER, DEC'D**

Late of Straban Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Administrator: Robert L. Uber, P.O. Box 608, Biglerville, PA 17307

Attorney: Puhl, Eastman & Thrasher, 220 Baltimore Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325

**ESTATE OF MARGARET E. WEAVER, DEC'D**

Late of Oxford Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Personal Representatives: Jeffrey C. Weaver, 1535 Bon-Ox Rd., New Oxford, PA 17350; John E. Weaver, 1781 Bon-Ox Rd., New Oxford, PA 17350

Attorney: G. Steven McKonly, Esq., 119 Baltimore Street, Hanover, PA 17331

**SECOND PUBLICATION****ESTATE OF MARIE C. EYLER, DEC'D**

Late of Mt. Pleasant Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Administrator: Jeanne K. Davis, 8605 Hampton Valley Rd., Emmitsburg, MD 21727

**ESTATE OF JACOB F. KRAMER, DEC'D**

Late of Latimore Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executor: Gary C. Kramer, 47 Crestview Drive, East Berlin, PA 17316

Attorney: John C. Zepp, III, Esq., P.O. Box 204, 8438 Carlisle Pike, York Springs, PA 17372

**ESTATE OF GEORGE S. LAMBERT, DEC'D**

Late of Cumberland Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Co-Executors: Nancy J. Bushey-Lambert, 2104 Taneytown Road, Gettysburg, PA 17325; Bonnie K. Brown, 107 Community Way, Apt 611, Staunton, VA 24401; Craig L. Lambert, 2150 Taneytown Road, Gettysburg, PA 17325

Attorney: Robert E. Campbell, Esq., Campbell & White, P.C., 112 Baltimore Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325

**ESTATE OF FELICITAS R. REESE, DEC'D**

Late of Oxford Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executrices: Linda Leonard and Luann Gebhart, c/o Amy S. Loper, Esq., O'Donnell & Barr Law Group, LLP, 11 Carlisle Street, Suite 301 Hanover, PA 17331

Attorney: Amy S. Loper, Esq., O'Donnell & Barr Law Group, LLP, 11 Carlisle Street, Suite 301 Hanover, PA 17331

**ESTATE OF SARAH E. SLAYBAUGH, DEC'D**

Late of Menallen Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executrix: Yvonne M. Gilbert, 1828 Baltimore Pike, Gettysburg, PA 17325

Attorney: Phillips & Phillips, 101 West Middle Street, Gettysburg, PA 17325

**ESTATE OF DONNA F. VARNER, DEC'D**

Late of Franklin Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Administratrix: Rosemary Todd, 8625 Anthony Highway, Waynesboro, PA 17268

Attorney: Jerrold A. Sulcove, Esq., Black and Davison, 82 West Queen Street, Chambersburg, PA 17201

**ESTATE OF JAMES ALLEN WALKER, DEC'D**

Late of Hamilton Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Administratrix: Gayle E. Walker, c/o Jennifer McKenrick Stetter, Esq., Stonesifer and Kelley, a division of Barley Snyder, 209 Broadway, Hanover, PA 17331

Attorney: Jennifer McKenrick Stetter, Esq., Stonesifer and Kelley, a division of Barley Snyder, 209 Broadway, Hanover, PA 17331

**NOTICE OF REVOCABLE TRUST ADMINISTRATION**  
**JON PENSYL REVOCABLE TRUST**

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN of the administration of the Jon Pensyl Revocable Trust dated January 5, 2012. Jon Pensyl, settlor of the Trust, of Franklin Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania died on April 5, 2017. All persons having claims against Jon Pensyl are requested to make known the same to the Trustee or Attorney named below. All persons indebted to Jon Pensyl are requested to make payment without delay to the Trustee or Attorney named below.

Jody A. Sieg, Trustee  
844 Hunterstown-Hampton Road  
New Oxford, PA 17350

Teeter, Teeter & Teeter  
108 West Middle Street  
Gettysburg, PA 17325

**THIRD PUBLICATION****ESTATE OF JEANNE MARIE BOLLINGER, DEC'D**

Late of Conewago Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Executrices: Jane R. Griffith, 209 Berwick Road, Abbottstown, PA 17301; Tamara J. Wolf, 319 Tallahassee Blvd., Abbottstown, PA 17301

Attorney: Elinor Albright Rebert, Esq., 515 Carlisle Street, Hanover, Pennsylvania 17331

**ESTATE OF PHYLLIS KNOX GETTIER, DEC'D**

Late of Oxford Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania

Personal Representative: Kevin Trump, 620 Jasonstown Rd., Westminster, MD 21158

**THIRD PUBLICATION CONTINUED**

ESTATE OF LEONA MAE SHAFFER,  
DEC'D

Late of Oxford Township, Adams  
County, Pennsylvania

Co-Executors: Dennis R. Shaffer, 4555  
Blue Hill Rd., Glenville, PA 17329;  
Robert P. Shaffer, 1116 Chatelaine Dr.,  
Fallston, MD 21047

Attorney: Keith R. Nonemaker, Esq.,  
Guthrie, Nonemaker, Yingst & Hart,  
LLP, 40 York Street, Hanover, PA  
17331

ESTATE OF PAMELA H. WEBSTER,  
DEC'D

Late of Huntington Township, Adams  
County, Pennsylvania

Executrix: Tammy Peros, c/o Christopher  
E. Rice, Esq., Martson Law Offices, 10  
East High Street, Carlisle, PA 17013

Attorney: Christopher E. Rice, Esq.,  
Martson Law Offices, 10 East High  
Street, Carlisle, PA 17013